Formation and composition of the 6th South African Armoured Division

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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND TO THE CAMPAIGN

Formation and composition of the 6th South African Armoured Division

At the battle of El Alamein, South Africa helped turn the tide of the war – and incurred 734 casualties in the process. Starting on 13 October 1942, the battle lasted twelve days. Apart from their romp through East Africa in the Abyssinian campaign of 1940/41, Alamein was South Africa’s first real taste of victory. The words of Winston Churchill’s “end of the beginning” speech at this juncture were totally relevant to South Africa’s contribution. The 1st SA Division was then pulled out of the line.
When the 1st Division was shipped home after Alamein, the plan was that South Africa would re-form two divisions to be sent back for further operations in North Africa, but this was not possible due to manpower shortages.1 In a speech to the 1st Division on 22 November 1942 at Quassasin, Egypt, Field-Marshal J.C. Smuts revealed to the officers and men that there would be a “pause” during which the 1st and 2nd divisions would be transformed into ‘tank divisions”.2
Amid much controversy, the 1st South African Division was disbanded and reformed as the 6th South African Armoured Division. The demise of the proud SA Tank Corps in particular, caused much bitterness. However, in terms of men, machinery and composition, the 6th SA Armoured Division was far removed from the amateur armies that took the field in East Africa and North Africa. In fire power, it was four times greater than the 1st Division had been at its strongest.3
The 6th South African Armoured Division was officially formed on 1 February 1943 at a conference at Defence Head Quarters in Pretoria. The first divisional parade was held at Zonderwater on 13 February. General W.H. Evered Poole wore the new divisional flash (a yellow triangle superimposed on a larger triangle of blue) the next day at a wings parade at Waterkloof when carrying out his first official duty as General Officer Commanding (GOC).4
The divisional emblem was a Sable head which in turn was selected as a tribute to the Southern Rhodesians serving as an integral part of the forces.5 The renowned military theorist, Karl von Clauswitz, wrote: “The order of battle is that division and combination of the different arms into separate parts of the whole army, and that form of disposition of those parts which is to be the rule throughout the whole campaign or war.”6 However, by the end of the year, the 6th SA Armoured Division’s order of battle was very different to that originally envisaged.7 The order of battle was to change a number of times during the course of the campaign. Appendix A shows the order of battle and battle strength as at the end of May 1944 at the beginning of the advance on Rome. Appendix B shows the composition as at 15 April 1945 just before the final offensive.
The division was made up of desert war veterans as well as new recruits sometimes referred to as “Tobruk avengers” who had answered General Dan Pienaar’s call to arms. There were also those who had been in uniform since the start of the war but had not left the Union. Of these, some were volunteers who had been kept out of active duty because of age; some were career soldiers who had spent the war thus far in a training role. In the words of Joel Mervis, it was a “mixed bag”.8
A large percentage of the 1st Division veterans did not make themselves available to fight outside the continent of Africa and declined to take the new General Service Oath. Regiments therefore had to be amalgamated to be brought up to strength. Each one of the artillery regiments in the division was an amalgamated one, but some infantry and tank regiments maintained their individual identity. The Royal Natal Carbineers (RNC) was one regiment which retained its identity, however it converted to infantry. Trooper Hodgson became Private Hodgson and informed his mother: “The organization of the regiment has been changed a lot; as you can see by my address we are no longer in squadrons but companies, which is the proper thing for the infantry.”9
South West Africa contributed its fair share of men, but Southern Rhodesia’s men in particular had volunteered with alacrity when the war broke out. Of the 9,187 white men in the forces, 6,520 served outside the colony. They were to suffer 228 casualties and earned nine decorations in the Italian campaign. White Rhodesian casualties in all services would total 913 men and 3 women killed in action or died during service. The total white population at the time was between 70,000 and 75,000. The Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment was absorbed into the Pretoria Regiment (PR), Prince Alfred’s Guard (PAG), and Special Service Battalion (SSB). A particularly large group of Southern Rhodesians joined the First City/Cape Town Highlanders (FC/CTH). In total, 1,400 Southern Rhodesians went to Italy with the 6th South African Armoured Division.10
Some units contained separate Rhodesian squadrons, batteries or companies complete with their own officers, and an attempt was made to keep them as purely Rhodesian as possible.11 These were:
3/17 (Rhodesia) Bty, 1/6/ Fd Rgt
1/22 (Rhodesia) A/Tk Bty, 1/11 A/Tk Rgt
“B” Sqn PAG
“C” Sqn SSB
“A” Sqn PR
“B” Coy FC/CTH
When Rhodesians were posted to the Special Service Battalion (SSB) during the reorganization of the 6th South African Armoured Division, the newcomers initially objected because of the humble origins of the regiment. The SSB was formed in 1933 in response to the poor white problem and unemployment during the great depression. The first recruits were of poor farming stock but the officer corps, partly British Army, was always first class.
Training was initially standard infantry training but in the Second World War it became a tank regiment. Their commanding officer during the Italian Campaign, Lieutenant-Colonel C.E.G. “Papa” Brits, became a legend for his strong leadership and caustic comments.12 In June 1943, the strength of the division was given as approximately 12,000 Europeans and 7,000 Cape Corps.13 Reinforcements continued to arrive throughout the year. From the transit camp at Hay Paddock in Pietermaritzburg, the RNC shipped out during September 1943 on the Stratheden.14 The RDLI conducted its own recruiting campaign in the Durban area. Initially, it was not going to be given a “second innings”, however, after an unintentional three months of embarkation leave, the regiment sailed on 27 November 1943 to join the division.15
The artillery was controlled by divisional HQ in order to obtain maximum efficacy, while the infantry were organized into motorised brigades. Clausewitz explains that a brigade typically numbered between 2,500 and 5,000 men, this being the number which can be directly commanded by one man, as all can be within the range of his voice.16 A motorised brigade is infantry in the context of an armoured division. At first there was one infantry brigade – 12 South African Motorised Brigade which consisted of:
First City/Cape Town Highlanders (FC/CTH)
Royal Natal Carbineers (RNC)
Witwatersrand Rifles / Regiment De la Rey (WR/DLR)
Immediately after the Battle of Monte Cassino, on 28 May 1944, 24 Guards Brigade came under command and stayed with the division until February 1945. In addition, to their own support personnel, their infantry consisted of:
1st Battalion, The Scots Guards
3rd Battalion, The Coldstream Guards
5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards
When it became known that the Guards Brigade would be passing out of command in February 1945, the division underwent a reshuffle and the 13th South African Motorised Brigade was formed. They included some experienced regiments and some newly arrived from the Union. They would consist of:
Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment (ILH/KimR).
Natal Mounted Rifles/South African Air Force Regiment (NMR/SAAF).
Royal Durban Light Infantry (RDLI).
15th Field Regiment, SAA (15 Fd Rgt).
Regiment Botha/Regiment President Steyn (BPS).
There was in fact, only one brigade which was “armoured” in the true sense of the word, and that was the 11th South African Armoured Brigade. This comprised three tank regiments working in cooperation with infantry:
Pretoria Regiment (Princess Alice’s Own) PR (PAO).
Prince Alfred’s Guard (PAG).
Special Service Battalion (SSB).
The Natal Mounted Rifles/South African Air Force Regiment (usually referred to simply as the NMR rather than the NMR/SAAF) were employed as armoured reconnaissance and operated independently from the brigade groups as did the RDLI.
The Frontier Force Rifles (affectionately known as “The Rif”) was infantry from India which came under command of the 6th South African Armoured Division in August 1944, after the rest period at Siena. The commanding officer and many other officers were British. They were under-equipped and lacking transport. Certain support personnel such as signallers were supplied by the 6th SA Armoured Division. The 4/13th FFR bore their full share of the fighting from September to February 1945, when they went to rest at Lucca.17
Full-time components of the division also included engineers, signals, field ambulances, quartermaster “Q” services, workshops, military police and divisional and brigade head quarters. In addition to 24 Guards Brigade and 4/13 FFR, various other units, mainly non- South African, flowed in and out of the division as dictated by the tides of war. One of the more permanent attachments was 166 (Newfoundland) Field Regiment.
The Non-European Army Services (NEAS) included coloured and black troops. Many served in Italy and some are buried there, but only the Cape Corps played a role in the 6th South African Armoured Division.18 In the ranks of non-European units (in Egypt and at home), there was unhappiness and frustration, partly due to unsympathetic officers and long periods of absence. It appears that the biggest grievance among the coloured community was that they were not being used in a fighting role. There had been some rioting and mutinous behaviour, more-so in the case of the Cape Corps than in the Native Military Corps (NMC).19
In addition, according to H.J. Martin and N. Orpen, “there had been an increase in cases of crime by individuals, including attempted rape, insolence, a growing disregard for discipline and a rapid falling off of morale”.20
The South African Air Force (SAAF) and South African Engineer Corps (SAEC) had been using black troops in Italy, before the arrival of the 6th South African Armoured Division and major problems were being encountered as they were faced with all the temptations and emotional stresses generated in Europe at war. For this reason, the 6th Division decided in 1943, not to use the Native Military Corps outside of the country and they were replaced by men of the Cape Corps which had absorbed the Indian and Malay Corps

Recruitment and replacements

Enlistment – an overview

Out of South Africa’s population of approximately 10,000,000 (of whom 1,116,500 were whites), a total of 345,324 men and women enlisted.24 Numbers vary according to the source, but citing the official yearbook of the Union of South Africa, Roos calculates that of the 570,000 men who were eligible for service, between 190,000 and 250,000 enlisted during the war. Approximately 150,000 white women and 80,000 black men also joined up.25
The reluctance of South Africans to serve seems to have been overstated. Taking into account that about fifty per cent of the white population was Afrikaans speaking, many of whom were ideologically opposed to the war, and many others were key-men in industry, it is not surprising that recruitment slowed to a trickle. Field-Marshal J.C. Smuts himself stated in March 1944 that the European population had responded magnificently to the call to arms.
“South Africa has only 570,000 European males between the ages of 20 and 60. The fact that so many of them have volunteered for full-time service, is a response which has not been surpassed by any of the Allied nations at war. It means that almost one out of every three males between the ages of 20 and 60 volunteered for full-time service.” In the same statement, the number of non-Europeans on service was put at “over 100,000”. The combined strength of the Union forces was therefore 300,000 – ten times stronger than it had been in 1939. These figures did not include the 60,000 already discharged from service.26
It appears that there had been an initial wave of enthusiasm to enlist, but in the latter stages of the war, the flow of volunteers became restricted to a particular demographic group. Monick writes that the amalgamation of battalions in World War Two is a clear indication of the fact that “the edge of the enthusiasm which had marked South Africa’s contribution to the Imperial cause in World War One had been blunted”. This did not apply to the Natal regiments who maintained their numbers throughout. By contrast, in the Transvaal battalions, two years of service appeared to be the limit of their front line capability.27 It is enlightening to note that only one third of all volunteers ever left the Union.28
There was a shortage of manpower – but it did not pertain to the military as a whole. The SAAF and non-combat units in the army were over-subscribed. According to one source, the UDF had 5,000 reserves stationed in Italy. Of these, it was estimated that 3,500 were fighting men (as opposed to support troops) of whom only 2,000 were fully trained. This represented an effective reserve force of ten per cent of the division strength – which is below the recommended 40 per cent which a fighting division should immediately have available. It was not unheard-of for a particular unit to have 60 per cent casualties. 29
The subject of enlistment is a vast one and no attempt is made at an exhaustive analysis. A short general discussion is followed by an examination of the few sources which relate to the UDF and the 6th Division in particular. The pertinent question here relates to the motivations and backgrounds of those men of enlistment age who declined to serve.

Volunteering

An omnipresent question in new military history relates to what motivates men to volunteer to fight. South African examples are few and far between compared to the work which emanates from the United States and elsewhere. Much work has been done on the motivations for enlistment during the American colonial period and the American Civil War. Karsten has found two sorts of studies on the motives of those who joined up – those that stress the ideological and patriotic motives for enlistment and those that find economic and less lofty motives. Karsten is clear that economic motives are inadequate for understanding enlistment motives.30 The more theoretical arguments relating to motivation will be discussed in the final chapter.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
a. Aims and objectives
b. Hypotheses
c. Elucidation of the title
d. The envisaged contribution of the thesis
e. Methodology, approach and procedure
f. Delimitations
g. International trends and prevailing schools of thought
CHAPTER 1: RELATED HISTORIOGRAPHY 
a. Review of the available sources
b. Keeping of the historical record
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND TO THE CAMPAIGN 
a. Formation and composition of the 6th South African Armoured Division
b. Recruitment and replacements
c. Demographics of the division
d. Officer corps
e. The South Africans as part of a multinational force
f. Summary of movements and the geography
CHAPTER 3: LIFE IN CAMP AND ON THE ROAD 
a. Camp conditions and facilities
b. Camp routine
c. Shelter and billets
d. On the road (The mobile phase)
CHAPTER 4: SUSTENANCE OF MIND AND BODY 
a. Supplies and kit
b. Meals and rations
c. Letters and parcels
d. The postal system
e. Ouma’s Gifts and Comforts Fund
f. Sustenance of the soul
CHAPTER 5: RECREATION AND LEISURE 
a. Reading matter
b. Radio, music and film
c. ENSA shows
d. Killing time
e. Physical and mental exercise
f. UDFI, welfare and women’s organizations
g. On leave
h. Money matters
i. Special occasions
CHAPTER 6: MISCONDUCT 
a. General discipline
b. Crimes against person
c. Crimes against property
d. Crimes against performance
e. Crimes against civilians and by civilians
f. Crimes against prisoners of war
g. Enforcement
h. Redress of grievances
i. The Helwan riots
CHAPTER 7: VICE 
a. Vino
b. Venus
c. VD (venereal disease)
CHAPTER 8: INTERFACE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 
a. Citizen soldiers
b. Army of occupation
CHAPTER 9: COMBAT AND BECOMING A CASUALTY 
a. Contextualizing the casualties
b. Battle casualties
c. Life expectancy according to unit and branch of service
d. Culture and the attitude to casualties
e. Battle Accidents
f. Evacuation of casualties
g. Facilities for the sick and wounded
h. Illness and ailments
i. Deaths and burials
CHAPTER 10: MENTALITIES, MORALE AND MOTIVATIONS 
a. Morale and motivation to fight
b. Battle fatigue (psychological casualties)
c. Killing and hostility
d. Fear and heroism
CHAPTER 11: FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
a. Experiential aspects
b. Conclusions on casualties
c. Conclusions on motivations
d. Memory as a category of analysis
ILLUSTRATIONS
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