Two systemic perspectives on psychosocial processes in public participation

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The “How?” of communication

Bateson (2000), Watzlawick et al. (1967) and others have suggested that all answers to the “How?” question can be classified into two broad categories: analogue and digital communication. These are terms borrowed from the field of engineering, and the difference between them may be defined as follows: in analogue communication there is some sort of continuity or resemblance between signifier and signified – between the message and what it is about. In digital communication this continuity is absent.
The Roman numerals “I”, “II” and “III” are simple examples of analogue communication: the number of vertical lines in the symbols corresponds to the magnitudes which these symbols represent. The Arabic numerals 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, …, on the other hand, are examples of digital communication: “4” is not larger than “3.” The bared fangs of a dog, which denote the threat of an attack, are another example of analogue communication: the bared fangs resemble the attack that might follow. Compare this with the skull-and-crossbones on the flag of a pirate ship, which also denotes the threat of an attack, but is an example of digital communication, since the symbol does not resemble (except perhaps in a very indirect way) that which it signifies.

The “About what?” of communication

Bateson (2000) also argued that all answers to the “About what?” question can be classified into two broad categories: communication about relationships and communication about things. A cat asks for milk by imitating the sounds that a young kitten would make to its mother. In so doing, it proposes a certain kind of relationship: it reminds its owner that it is as dependent upon him or her for sustenance as a kitten is upon its mother. The most accurate English translation of the cat’s message would therefore not be “Milk! Milk!” but “Mama!
Mama!” or “Dependency! Dependency!” It is up to the cat’s owner to make the deduction that what the animal wants, is milk. Two hunters planning a kill or two executives discussing a business deal, on the other hand, are communicating about things. The relationship between them (whether it be friendship, trust, mistrust, etc.) is temporarily forgotten in favour of the task at hand.
The distinction between communication about relationships and communication about things is closely akin to the distinction between emotion and reason. If the truism that “relationships are matters of the heart” is to be believed, then, by the same token, “things” are matters of the intellect. It is, of course, possible to reason about relationships, but such mental activity is one step removed from the experience of the relationship. To know about someone is not the same as knowing someone.

Human and other mammalian communication

A third point made by Bateson is that most mammalian communication is analogue and is about relationships. The baring of fangs mentioned above is a case in point. The attack that it refers to is not a “thing” but a certain type of relationship between two animals. The same is true of the kitten-like sounds of a hungry cat.
Human language represents an important deviation from this rule, however. It differs from the communication of other mammals on at least two counts: first, it is primarily digital. Except in cases of onomatopoeia, the sounds of words do not imitate the things they denote (Deacon, 1997). Second, language offers the opportunity to communicate about things as well as about relationships. A human child, unlike a cat, is able to convey the message “I want milk” in unambiguous terms.
This does not mean that the new, digital method of communicating about things supplanted the older, analogue method of communicating about relationships; rather, it grew up alongside it as a sapling might grow up in the shadow of an adult tree. It also does not mean that human beings never use digital communication for communicating about relationships. However, human beings still communicate far more effectively and reliably about relationships through non-verbal signals than through words (Trenholm & Jensen, 1992), as is illustrated by the following hypothetical scenario:
When boy says to girl, “I love you,” he is using words [digital communication] to convey that which is more convincingly conveyed by his tone of voice and his movements [analogue communication]; and the girl, if she has any sense, will pay more attention to those accompanying signs than to the
words. (Bateson, 2000, p. 412)

READ Brümmer on Meaning and the Christian Faith

Communication and logical types

It was pointed out in Section 4.3.2 that instances of communication can often be distinguished from one another in terms of their logical type. The difference between the communicative function of a map and that of its accompanying legend was used as an example: while the map tells us something about a particular territory, the legend tells us how the map should be interpreted. Hence, the information communicated by a legend belongs to a higher logical type than the information conveyed by the map. The legend constitutes a meta-message in relation to the map.
It turns out that the distinction between verbal, digital communication about things and non-verbal, analogue communication about relationships closely corresponds to the distinction between messages and meta-messages (Perold, 2001). For instance, I might direct a critical remark at you, but my facial expression while delivering the remark might convey the meta-message, “I am not being serious” or “Do not take my remark personally.” This meta-message reassures you that the positive relationship between us remains intact despite the critical remark.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction.
1.1 WHAT IS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION?
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
1.3 WHY A SYSTEMS THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE?
CHAPTER 2: Methodology
2.1 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW:GUIDING ASSUMPTIONS IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
2.2 DEVELOPING A MODEL OF THE PSYCHOSOCIAL DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
2.3 APPLYING THE THEORY TO ADDRESS PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
2.4 THESIS OUTLINE
CHAPTER 3: Public Participation in Perspective
3.1 A HISTORY OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
3.2 BENEFITS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
3.3 APPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
3.4 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION MODELS AND TECHNIQUES
3.5 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.6 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
3.7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
CHAPTER 4: An overview of systems theory
4.1 BASIC CONCEPTS OF SYSTEMS THEORY
4.2 SYSTEMS AND VARIABLES
4.3 LEVELS AND HIERARCHIES IN SYSTEMS
4.4 ECONOMICS OF FLEXIBILITY
4.5 PHASE SPACE
4.6 VALID AND INVALID DESCRIPTIONS OF SYSTEMS
4.7 CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER 5: An overview of psychological concepts
CHAPTER 6: Three systemic “maps” of public participation
CHAPTER 7: Two systemic perspectives on psychosocial processes in public participation
CHAPTER 8: Conclusions
CHAPTER 9: References