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Distributive approach
The distributive approach frames negotiations as zero-sum transactions: essentially competitive, or win-lose. A partner who uses this approach would try by all means to drive negotiations through to completion at the expense of the opponent. Such negotiations are grounded in the principle of the power base as a bargaining point. So negotiators will go all out to secure a larger slice of the pie at the expense of the other partner. Thus, they will use their power base to influence every negotiated aspect in each phase of the negotiation process in their favour. The consequent disadvantage of this approach is that negotiations tend to be protracted, which adversely leads to cost overruns. Furthermore, negotiations can stall if one partner feels they do not have a fair share of the negotiation pact. This can generate rebuttals and retaliations in future negotiations, and produce conditions that do not promote long-term relationships.
Integrative approach
Proponents of this approach recognise the need to look beyond value alone when they negotiate. They strive to multiply gains for everyone involved in the process by enlarging and sharing the pie (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). This approach promotes cooperation, joint problem-solving efforts, and joint decision-making processes in pursuit of a win-win scenario with mutual gain efforts. It is argued that when negotiators follow such an approach, they tend to be more sensitive to their opponent’s social needs; ultimately this can lead to a more stable relationship.
Current debate on approaches
Negotiation theory has shifted in recent years (Korobkin, 2013), and the process is now viewed “in 3-D” (p. 52). Thus, negotiations are less frequently framed in terms of conventional win-win, win-lose, or lose-lose dynamics, and now focus more on creativity and value-claiming. This shift challenges the common assumption that the moves in a negotiation game are fully determined at the outset. This also represents a departure from earlier negotiation analytic approaches which were based on a dyadic perspective. Essentially therefore, the field of negotiation theory is gradually moving from straightforward dyadic analysis to multivariate and multilateral analysis, characterised by different assumptions, and reflective of information payoff structure (Bedard, 2017).
NEGOTIATION PHASES
Although some theorists view negotiations as an activity (Firth, 1995), others frame it as a process with distinct activities per phase (Zartman, 2008). This divergence of views reflects the proponents’ underlying assumptions about negotiations.
This study aligns itself with the proponents of process, on the basis that negotiation is not a once-off event, but involves a number of activities which allow negotiators to consider different options in order to arrive at meaningful outcomes, or agreements. Process therefore involves the flow and patterns of negotiations (Murtoaro & Kujala, 2007). Thus, a negotiation process can be viewed in terms of how negotiation-related activities are streamlined, as evidenced in a series of phases with defined activities and outcomes.
Zartman (1989) posits that it is challenging to phase a negotiation process because the lack of sharp boundaries allows negotiation teams to move back and forth between phases. However, phasing is important because it gives structure: it assists negotiation teams to transit from general principles to the details of an agreement.
Furthermore, such sequencing allows negotiating teams to move back and forth between the identified phases as and when events require them to shift, even if this means revisiting an earlier phase. Thus, phases serve as an operational roadmap for the negotiating teams.
The table and subsequent discussion below summarise the various negotiation models and their phases, as well as the similarities and differences in underlying assumptions, and the contextual influences of country and culture diversity.
CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
1.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.2. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.4. PURPOSE STATEMENT
1.5. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
1.6. DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMINOLOGY
1.7. THESIS STRUCTURE
CHAPTER 2
2. BACKGROUND TO HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH AFRICA
2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.2. NATURE AND ANTECEDENTS TO ORGANISATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
2.3. HISTORY OF DELIVERING STATE HOUSING THROUGH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA
2.4. RESEARCH SETTING
CHAPTER 3
3. LITERATURE REVIEW: NEGOTIATING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
3.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
3.2. PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS AS A DOMAIN
3.3. NEGOTIATION APPROACHES AND PHASES
3.4. FACTORS THAT HAVE A BEARING ON PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS
3.5. REFLECTIONS ON POWER BALANCE WHEN NEGOTIATING HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS
3.6. DYNAMICS IN NEGOTIATING HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
3.7. A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE HOUSING PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATION CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
3.8. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 4
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
4.1. INTRODUCTION
4.2. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY
4.3. RESEARCH APPROACH
4.4. RESEARCH CHOICE
4.5. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.6. RESEARCH STRATEGY
4.7. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS
4.8. DATA COLLECTION METHODS
4.9. DATA ANALYSIS METHOD
4.10. CREDIBILITY, DEPENDABILITY, TRANSFERABILITY AND GENERALISABILITY
CHAPTER 5
5. PHASING OF THE HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTERNSHIP NEGOTIATION PROCESS
5.1. INTRODUCTION
5.2. NUMBER OF PHASES
5.3. THE INFLUENCE OF PROJECT CONTEXTUAL AND CONDITIONAL FACTORS ON THE PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATION PHASING PROCESS
5.4. THE INFLUENCE OF PARTNERS’ RESOURCE CAPACITY AND RESOURCE CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATION PHASING PROCESS
5.5. THE INFLUENCE OF NEGOTIATING A PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON THE PHASING PROCESS
5.6. POWER BALANCE DURING NEGOTIATIONS IN EACH PHASE
5.7. CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 6
6. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
6.1. INTRODUCTION
6.2. HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATION PHASES
6.3. INFLUENCE OF CONTEXTUAL AND CONDITIONAL FACTORS ON THE PHASING OF HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS
6.4. THE INFLUENCE OF PARTNERS’ RESOURCE ENDOWMENT AND CONTRIBUTION ON THE PHASING OF HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS
6.5. THE INFLUENCE OF PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON THE PHASING OF HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS
6.6. THE INFLUENCE OF POWER BALANCE ON THE PHASING OF HOUSING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS
6.7. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
6.8. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 7
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. INTRODUCTION
7.2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY
7.3. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
7.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
7.5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
7.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
REFERENCES