INTEGRATING POPULATION AND SCHOOL ENROLMENT TRENDS

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CHAPTER 3: INTEGRATING POPULATION DYNAMICS AND SCHOOL ENROLMENT TRENDS

Population issues impact on many aspects of socio- economic development in general particularly with regard to health, education, housing, labour force participation as facets of our social lives. Population dynamics, involving fertility, mortality and migration processes, have significant roles to play in planning for the social, economic and political development of our societies. When children are born, for example, we need to plan for their health care and their education. Regional disparities cause people to migrate from one area to the other in search of better opportunities, and they therefore need housing and other basic services in the new areas, including education for their children. In order to reduce the rate at which persons are affected by diseases, hospitals, clinics, doctors and nurses are needed. Population dynamics influence population growth (which may be positive or negative) and hence cause school-age populations to fluctuate. In order to address these changes effectively, strategies to adjust to these dynamics need to be carefully researched.

POPULATION DYNAMICS AND LEARNER ENROLMENT

The aim of this research was to apply a spatio-temporal perspective to the relationship between the provision of primary school education and demographic change. Population dynamics as a driving force affect learner enrolments. Key population variables affecting the size and characteristics of the school-age population are fertility, mortality and migration. Population size, growth and age structure as well as the gender and marital status of the people also directly or indirectly play a role. Education in a country is seen as a pillar of economic development because it determines the future economy of any country (Oyoo 2003). In order to achieve this, the behaviour of key variables such as trends in fertility, mortality and migration need to be carefully examined. These demographic dynamics together with population characteristics operate not in isolation, but in combination, in influencing and directing population growth at all levels – globally, regionally, nationally and locally. It is necessary to understand the demographic transition of any population in a given place, because socio-economic and political influences shape its demographic characteristics including that of the school-age population. Since the socio-economic and political factors of a country have an influence on the demography of a population including the school-going one, they cannot be ignored but form part of the discussion of this research.
Population dynamics are connected to the school-age population that constitutes the learner enrolment in local schools (Figure 3.1). Demographic processes, and the economic and social development of an area, directly influence the school-age population through births and migration; while the physical environment influences it through affecting settlement patterns. When there is a mismatch between the location of available schools and population distribution, governments face a number of challenges over time that may be of a local, national or global nature. The challenge is of a global nature if problems of a social or economic in nature are created in one country and affect other countries. This South African study sought to investigate these connections, which might have adverse effects on learners, educators, communities, the Department of Basic Education or the country at large. Should these connections exist, understanding their effect should enable decision makers and planners to make informed decisions about appropriate locations for primary schools thus providing necessary basic education to children living in particular localities within their jurisdiction.
Continuous decrease in learner enrolments over time, result in some schools getting shut down. Other direct effects of declining learner enrolments include the redeployment of educators, the relocation of learners to neighbouring schools and the additional costs of transporting learners to new schools. Declining learner enrolments also render the schools concerned uneconomic, since some classrooms stand unused because of too few learners (Retnakumar 2005). The closure of schools may have an indirect effect on the community concerned, such as when young adults with small children out-migrate from areas because of the unavailability of schools for young children. Long distance travel by children between home and schools in neighbouring villages indicates that a school is inappropriately located in terms of access. Out-migration of the young and economically active population may disrupt social cohesion, and leave local communities demoralised and stuck in a stagnant economy with little development.
In the areas characterised by a surge in the number of school-age children because of increasing fertility and in-migration, for example, such sudden increases in the number of the school-age population usually finds the authorities unprepared and unable to provide adequate resources for the learners. In order to keep pace with changes in learner enrolments and to adjust to these fluctuations, authorities need an understanding of how demographic processes operate, and of how they are linked to education. With this background in mind this chapter touches on the demographic transition theory, global population growth, and population dynamics, and, trends in school enrolments.
Demographic transition refers to a change from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates, and this occurs when countries transform over time from primitive states to modern ones. In this theory all countries are expected to transform from primitive and agrarian state to industrialised one. The demographic transition theory has according to Caldwell (1976) in his article entitled “A restatement of demographic transition” shifted a little from its original position, particularly when applied to developing countries. The demographic theory has changed in the last few decades owing to analysis of differential fertility. The first demographic theorist Warren Thomson in 1929, as stated by Caldwell (1976) saw industrialisation and urbanisation as responsible for modifying the role of the family in production, consumption, education and recreation. It was developed after studying experiences in Western Europe and North America. The reduced importance of the family and economic value of the children have weakened the need for a large family. The high survival rate of infants assures parents that someone in the family will carry forward the family name and look after ageing parents. Caldwell (1976) argued that 20 decades earlier the term industrialisation and urbanisation were replaced by modernisation because it became clear that great number of people in the Third World were unlikely to be living in industrial cities for generation. The demographic transition theory did not allow for the possibility that the new way of life and the consequent new fertility behaviour might be generated in the urban industrial setting and then be exported to non-urban and non-industrial population. Caldwell argues that fertility is essentially the product of social rather than economic change. This is evident in the rural areas of Vhembe District, where total fertility has declined to 2.4 children per woman (Kyei 2012), yet its urban population comprise of only 1.1% (Vhembe District Municipality 2011).
For comparison purposes, it is crucial to cite examples of similar processes in places other than South Africa because this may give insight into different ways of solving the same or similar problems. Non-demographic variables such as economic and educational achievement of a population may influence births and migration. Economic influences and employment opportunities vary across space and nations. Climate and the political situation in a place also influence its settlement patterns.
Migration of the young population into or out of an area, in large numbers, results in the shift in the age structure of the population. When a large number of the young and economically active members of a population migrate out of an area, the area becomes dominated by an ageing population, while in the area of destination the population is dominated by youths or young adults. According to the United Nations (2010), the number of children aged from 5 to 14 has been declining since the year 2000. The change was rapid, but it is expected to slow down between 2010 and 2025. In the United States of America, the proportion of the population younger than 18 years of age has decreased from 25.7% in 2000 to 24% in 2010, and is expected to fall further, to 23.6% in 2030 (Centre for Public Education 2012).
Although some developing countries still experience high fertility rates, the proportion of older persons continues to rise. Globally it is rising by 2.0% each year, faster than the increase in population as a whole. At the same time, in 2005, eighty-five countries that constituted 45% of the world population exhibited fertility levels at or below replacement level (United Nations 2008). Since changes in world population have impacts on the social, political and economic lives of people, this study looked at the problems created at all scales, global, regional national and local scales. The problem of declining learner enrolments at schools is worldwide, and gaps need to be identified in order to find a common-ground approach that will not only address challenges in South African but could also be implemented in other parts of the world. The theme of this research is about changes in population characteristics over time and space and how they affect the provision of education in Vhembe District, a typical South African rural area. However, education is a global phenomenon and changes in population characteristics affect the provision of education in South African in the same way as they do in other parts of the world.
The consequences of the mismatch between population status and the location of schools may be reversible. Improper planning on the provision of education may trigger responses from the side of the community (Figure 3.2) and these challenges may be social, economic or political in nature. Socially educators who have established themselves in a setting may feel demoralised if relocated to new schools due to educator rationalisation. Where a school is forced to shut down due to declining learner enrolment, parents may feel disempowered and also incur additional costs of transporting their children to a new school.
The government faces a dilemma, between closing down the school or letting it continue to function. How does the government plan for education to accommodate all the grades, facilities and other basic needs if the enrolment is unsustainable? Haphazard planning may also cause problems like competing for learners by schools located in close proximity. The connection between the location of schools and population status informs the decision-maker in developing and implementing policies. Policies, on the other hand, are driven by changes in the economic, social and political situation in a country over time and space. Initiation of new policies may on the other hand drive human and government actions to desired effects. This illustration helps in the understanding of the connection between population dynamics and the location of schools in Vhembe District in Limpopo and, in fact, anywhere in the world. Policy issues are important in delivering equal and just primary education and cannot be ignored in any modern societies.

GLOBAL POPULATION GROWTH

Population growth is one of the forces that influence changes in societies and calls on government authorities to act and adjust accordingly. The situational analysis of trends in population and the provision of education in South African schools are compared to that of the world as a whole because some strategies to improve education are initiated at international levels. Through the UN and UNESCO, countries meet at world conferences to discuss education issues and initiate policies intended to improve the education of children. Countries are encouraged to collect data on their education systems. The data enable the UN and UNESCO to compile a database on educational matters such as pupil/educator ratios, educator qualifications, access to education by learners, and class size; and also to publish country reports. Countries are expected to work within the six “Education for All” (EFA) framework goals and to report on their progress towards those goals by 2015 (DBE 2010c). (The EFA goals are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, which focuses on education policies). This investigation therefore began by establishing why countries succeed or fail in their attempts to develop and implement education policies, and also how countries can learn from one another.
The global population before the year 1800 was less than 1 billion. During the industrial revolution, mortality was reduced while fertility increased owing to improved medical services and food production. The reduction in mortality and increases in fertility during the period resulted in additional persons, making the population grow and reach two billion by the beginning of the twentieth century. The twentieth century saw population increasing much faster, to reach three billion in the 1959. From the 1959, it took population growth only 40 years to double and the total world population reached 6 billion in 1999 (Population Reference Bureau 2012). The figure in 2001 was just above 6 billion and it took the world only one decade to add another one billion persons to its population (to make it seven billion in October 2011). Globally, population continues to grow in many places on earth.
The pace of population growth varies over time and space. Initially, the growth rate was slow, but it changed very rapidly in the period after World War II. The developed countries have already reached stable population growth, while developing countries continue to grow by varying degrees. The pace at which population is growing may be grouped into five categories, namely countries with very high annual population growth; countries with high, but declining, population growth rate; countries with intermediate growth rate; countries with stable population growth; and, finally, countries with negative population growth. Table 3.1 shows the total fertility and growth rates of selected countries (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2013). The countries displaying a high fertility rate are located in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa and Namibia show an intermediate population growth rate of less than 1% per annum and total fertility rates (TFR) approaching a fertility replacement level. Census 2011 results give the South African growth rate for 2011 as 1.2% and that of Vhembe District as 0.8 (Statistics South Africa 2012a).
The global population growth rate started to show a declining trend from the 1960s. The world growth rate in the 1960s was 2.1%, and currently it stands at 1.2%. Even though the world’s population is displaying an overall reduction in its rate of increase, population numbers in developing countries continue to increase while those in the developed world have stabilised and some even show a negative growth rate (Figure 3.3). The decline in both fertility and mortality in the developed world is responsible for stable population growth, while in the developing world fertility rates above the replacement level and declining mortality are responsible for continuous population growth.

FERTILITY

In 2013 the global total fertility rate per woman was 2.5 children (Population Reference Bureau 2014). However, global fertility varies from region to region, with Africa having an average growth rate of 4.7, and North America an average of less than 2.0, children per woman. Fertility patterns have changed dramatically owing to varied reasons that include access to family planning; urbanisation; level of education; female employment; and economic considerations. The improved economy, medical services and awareness of health issues led to a decline in mortality and high child survival rate. Due to high child survival rate, there was no need to give birth repeatedly to ensure that some of the children would escape infant death. Lyager (2010) believes factors leading to fertility decline also include factors such as number of children considered acceptable; a transformation in lifestyles; the costs of pre-natal controls against those of post-natal ones; and the perceptions of people in the reproductive stage of life. Declining birth is responsible for declining school-age population and the closure of primary schools in the developed and in some developing countries like South Africa. Births, school–age population and learner enrolments have a causal relationship.
Lyager (2010) identified a theoretical framework that is able to incorporate insights from different theories and can be used to explain the transition from high to low fertility. He merged the presence of different factors that he viewed as being responsible for the decline in fertility in a particular setting. He also combined the views of Caldwell (1980), who according to him focused on intra-familial wealth flows as a cause of fertility decline; and those of Becker (1960), who concentrated on income. Lyager (2010) believes that if these factors are treated separately, one cannot explain all known fertility transitions. He is also of the opinion that the explanation of fertility transition should be ideational (i.e. the change in people’s perceptions should be recognised) or interactive (where it is recognised that societal changes do not affect fertility in isolation from other aspects). He adopted Mason’s (1997) model, which states that fertility level is determined by people’s perceptions regarding children’s probability of surviving; the costs of having offspring; and the benefits associated with having children. According to this approach, high child mortality rates induced parents to have many children. With the decline in child mortality, child survival is assured and there is no need to give birth to many children. In the past, the benefits of having many children were greater, since families needed to be self-sufficient, but since the decline in subsistence farming and the rise of the market-oriented economy and the abolishment of child labour, the perceptions of those in the reproductive stage of life have changed. The extended family household has been or is being replaced by the nuclear type of family in many countries, both developed and developing. The preference for large families has been replaced by the desire to have fewer children.
Exogenous factors such as family planning, educational achievement and women empowerment also play a major role in lowering fertility. There is now easier access to, and greater acceptance of, the use of contraceptives than was the case before because the costs of pre-natal controls have been reduced. The total fertility ratios of many countries have declined, and that of South Africa is 2.4 children per woman. With an increase in urbanisation and the high cost of living in cities and towns, many individuals decide to have small families. The transition has been observed in the Vhembe District of Limpopo as well, where people’s inclination to have large families has changed to preference for smaller families. The total fertility ratio in Vhembe declined from 5.0 children per woman in 2001 to 3.6 in 2006 (Statistics South Africa 2007); and to 2.5 in 2012 (Kyei 2012). This shows a rapid decline in fertility and the rate has been halved in only eleven years due to wider acceptance of the use of contraceptives by women.
All developing countries have been projected by the United Nations to reach a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 by the year 2050 (United Nations 1997; The Economist 2009). The pace at which fertility will decline will be determined by the socio-economic development of a country, and rapid fertility decline will usually require rapid development. Bongaarts (2002) noted that increases in life expectancy and literacy appear to be responsible for the decline in fertility. The first group of countries to experience fertility transition consisted of Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the southern European countries. Countries following this first group were Russia, India and Japan (Kirk 1996). The fertility transition in all the countries mentioned above was slow, but it is much faster for countries in which the transition came later. The transition started before the last quarter of the nineteenth century in Europe and the contributing factors were urban life, employment, the mobility of young people, education, the cost of raising children, the decline in the labour value of children, women’s independence, a change in norms and values, and the diffusion of knowledge. The Population Reference Bureau (2012) views fertility transition as a worldwide phenomenon, first realised in now developed countries and more recently in developing countries.
At the end of the fertility transition, populations are characterised by smaller family size. Economic, social, political and environmental factors are influencing the way global population changes. Factors such as the use of contraceptives, urbanisation and the employment of women are responsible for the decline in family size. In Sweden in the early nineteenth century fertility was 5.0, while recently in the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa it was as high as 8.0 children per woman. Education for girls lowers fertility by between 0.3 to 0.5 children for each additional year at school. In Latin America, fertility rates declined from more than 5.0 children in 1970 to just above 2.0 children today, while in North Africa fertility dropped from 6.5 to 3.0 children per woman (Moultrie and Timaeus 2002; Statistics South Africa 2011b).
The Central Intelligence Agency’s (2013) TFR estimates for 2012 show that about 108 countries globally have reached the transition convergence stage (an average TFR of 2.1 children per woman). Fertility transition is inversely related to development, and especially to high levels of education and improved health. The pace of transition tends to be fast soon after the onset of the transition but slows down towards the convergence of the transition (Bongaarts 2002). The pace of fertility transition also depends on the level of development; and those countries in which the transition onset occurs when the development levels are low may experience stalling fertility at higher fertility rates. The pace that the transition keeps has implications for short- and long-term planning in the provision of education. If the declining pace is fast, the education authorities are faced with the challenge of the emergence of uneconomic schools, while the slow pace will give the authorities adequate time to plan and improve on the provision of quality education.

Current trends in fertility

Change in population is influenced by three worldwide demographic variables, which operate as a totality in order to increase or decrease population. Fertility and mortality are responsible for natural population growth by increasing and decreasing population respectively. The increase or decrease in population that is the result of migration is influenced by both physical and cultural factors. The section on population dynamics highlights the importance of understanding fertility, mortality and migration trends and their behaviour as determinants of the school-age population that is required to feed the school.
Fertility is the main demographic process influencing learner enrolments, because birth adds to the population needed for schools. If the fertility rate is very high and so is the school-age population in relation to available resources, schools face the problem of overcrowding and inadequate facilities for effective teaching and learning. High fertility rates are associated with poor communities, high dependency; and poor economic development. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2012) estimated total fertility rates (TFR) in 222 countries throughout the world in 2012. The highest total fertility was recorded in Niger, with 7.52 children per woman; followed by Uganda, with a TRF of 6.65; and Mali, with 6.35 children per woman. The total fertility rate refers to the number of children who would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific rates (The World Data Bank 2012). Kyei (2012) in his study of teenage fertility indicated that the total fertility rate of Limpopo was 2.5. This is an indication that in a few years to come it will reach the replacement level if the current declining rate is maintained. Fertility declined by 1.1% in seven years (i.e. 0.15% per annum on average).
There are 18 countries with a TFR of 5.0 children and above per woman throughout the world, and they are all situated in sub-Saharan Africa. Twenty-one countries have TFRs that range from 4.02 to 4.96; 22 countries have TFRs that vary between 3.1 and 3.98; and 68 countries have TFRs that lie between 2.00 and 2.98. The countries with TRFs that range between 2.00 and 2.98 include South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and Morocco in Africa. Ninety-two countries have TFRs that have gone below the replacement fertility level. TFRs in this group of countries vary between 0.78 in Singapore to 2.00 in French Polynesia (CIA 2012). The countries with very low TFRs are the countries that are highly industrialised. The TFR there is below 2.00 and indicates an ageing society that is decreasing in size because of fertility rates that are below the replacement level. Figure 3.4 shows where different levels of TFRs are concentrated. Central Africa is characterised by high TFRs, while South Africa and Namibia can be compared to North and South America, North Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia and Greenland.
According to The Economist (2009), in the next few years the world will have only just enough children to replace itself. In 2005, a population of about 2.9 out of 6.5 billion were living in countries at or below fertility replacement level; and this is expected to rise to 50% by the mid-2020s and to stabilise by 2050. The Economist further stated that in 1970 only 24 countries had had total fertility rates of 2.1 children per woman, while in 2009 the number had increased to 70 countries. In developing countries, fertility fell by half between 1950 and 2000, from 6.0 to about 3.0 children. The decline in fertility in some developing countries is very rapid. For example, it took Britain 130 years but South Korea only 30 years to reduce its fertility to the same level .The same level of decline in fertility took Mauritius only ten years to reach.
What this shows is that fertility decline is moving very fast in developing countries even though social change is not happening as quickly (Bongaarts 2002; The Economist 2009). The change from a low to a high standard of living is responsible for fertility decline. The countries with a high standard of living have low fertility rates while the counties with high fertility rates are economically poor. In its study of Indonesia, The Economist (2009) noted people’s perception that each birth reduces the likelihood of a woman getting a job; it lowers household income and pushes some families into poverty. The authors of the publication came to the conclusion that the combination of wealth and education reduces fertility, while poverty and illiteracy have the opposite effect.
Fertility rates are only by level of education and economic development, but also by other factors that are linked to the desire not to have children, such as non-marriage and voluntary childlessness, which symbolise social change in societies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONTENTS PAGE
DECLARATION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
ABSTRACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1: THIS STUDY AS GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH
1.2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.3: VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
1.4: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.5: RESEARCH DESIGN
CHAPTER 2: THE CULTURAL AND PHYSICAL SETTING OF VHEMBE DISTRICT
2.1: CULTURAL BACGROUND
2.2: CULTURAL LANDSCAPE
2.3 PHYSICAL BACKROUND OF VHEMBE DISTRICY
2.4: INFRASTRUCTURE
2.5: DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOOLS IN VHEMBE DISTRICT
CHAPTER 3: INTEGRATING POPULATION AND SCHOOL ENROLMENT TRENDS
3.1: POPULATION DYNAMICS AND LEARNER ENROLMENT
3.2: GLOBAL POPULATION GROWTH
3.3: FERTILITY
3.4: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
3.5: MIGRATION
3.6: TRENDS IN PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENTS
CHAPTER 4: POLICY ISSUES AND THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION
4.1: POPULATION DYNAMICS AND REALITY
4.2: EDUCATION FOR ALL: GLOBAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
4.3: SCHOOL INFRASTRUCTURE
4.4: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES
4.5: EDUCATION AS A SOCIETAL REALITY
CHAPTER 5: LIVING SPACES AND SCHOOLING IN VHEMBE DISTRICT
5.1: PEOPLE AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS
5.2: SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLING
5.3: IMPACT OF SCHOOL CLOSURES
5.4: CHALLENGEES IN THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION
5.5: LEARNER ENROLMENTS AND THEIR DECLINE
CHAPTER 6: SUSTAINABLE PRIMARY SCHOOLS
6.1: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS OF SCHOOLS
6.2: POLICY ISSUES AND THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION
6.3: CHANGING SCHOOL ENROLMENTS
6.4: COPING STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY SCHOOLS
6.5: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS
6.6: ADAPTING TO CHANGING LEARNER ENROLMENTS
6.7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
7: LIST OF REFERENCES
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