INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE STANDARDS REVELANT TO THE LRA ATORICITY IN UGANDA

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Operation North (1991)

The government of Uganda first launched an operation code named ‘Operation North’ in March 1991. In preparation for the offensive and counterinsurgency the entire Northern Uganda was locked down, all humanitarian organisations were forced to leave and a media blackout was imposed. The government allegedly committed serious human rights violations against civilians during this period, including torture of about three dozen prisoners in an underground pit in Gulu, extra-judicial killings and detention of 18 prominent politicians and local leaders among hundreds of other people from Acholi.35
As part of the operation, the then Minister for the North, Betty Bigombe, created the Arrow Boys, composed of locally recruited young men mostly armed with bows and arrows as a form of local defence.36 The creation of this group led Kony to believe that he had lost the population support and he blamed civilians for the cooperation with and perceived support of the government. He therefore escalated the reprisals and intensified killings.37 The LRA started mutilating civilians; cutting off hands, noses and ears; padlocking mouths shut through holes cut in lips, or simply hacking civilians to death with machetes. ‘Operation North’ did not succeed in destroying the insurgency, so Betty Bigombe, leading a delegation of elders and religious leaders from Acholiland initiated the first face-to-face meeting with representatives of the LRA.39 The LRA asked for general amnesty for its combatants and stated that they would not surrender but were willing to return ‘home’.
There were several meetings and protracted negotiations but the parties failed to reach an agreement.40 The LRA broke off negotiations on 2 February 1994 and President Museveni in turn gave a seven-day deadline for the LRA to surrender.41 These events ended the peace initiative and led to the retreat of the LRA into South Sudan and the continued attacks against civilians in Northern Uganda.42 There were several other attempts at peace talks after this, mainly spearheaded by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) that managed to keep open a window of communication with the LRA. There was mention of peace negotiations but neither the LRA nor the government of Uganda committed to it.43

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
1.2 Consequences of the LRA conflict
1.2.1 Operation North (1991)
1.2.2 Operation Iron Fist (2002)
1.2.3 Operation Lightening Thunder and ‘exportation’ of the LRA conflict
1.3 Statement of the problem
1.4 Research questions
1.5 Definition of terms
1.6 Objective
1.7 Methodology
1.8 Literature review
1.9 Overview of chapters
CHAPTER TWO INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE STANDARDS REVELANT TO THE LRA ATORICITY IN UGANDA .
2.1 Introduction
2.2 War crim
2.2.1 ‘Internationalised’ conflict?
2.2.2 Threshold for application
2.2.3 Acts punishable as war crimes
2.3 Crimes against humanity
2.3.1 Threshold of crime
2.3.2 Acts punishable as crimes against humanity
2.4 Conclusion
CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION OF STATES TO ADDRESS CERTAIN CRIMES
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Duty to investigate, prosecute or extradite
3.2.1 Geneva Conventions and Protocol
3.2.2 Rome Statute
3.2.3 Protocols to the Great Lakes Pac
3.2.4 CAT
3.2.5 UN resolutions and ‘soft laws’
3.3 Obligation to enact penal sanction
3.4 Obligation to respect, ensure rights and provide remedies
3.5 Legality of amnesties in international law
3.6 Accountability mechanisms
3.6.1 Prosecutorial options
3.6.2 Non-prosecutorial options
3.7 Intervention by human rights bodies
3.8 Conclusion
CHAPTER FOUR SHORT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS? UGANDA’S AMNESTY ACT AND THE AGREEMENT ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION
4.1 Introduction
4.2 How the Amnesty Act was applied
4.2.1 Government’s attitude towards amnesty
4.2.2 Resource and time-bound limitation
4.2.3 Crimes committed in other states and universal jurisdiction
4.3 The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and its Annexure
4.3.1 Formal prosecutions4.3.2 Investigations
4.3.3 Historical clarification and truth telling
4.3.4 Reparations
4.3.5 Traditional justice
4.3.6 Relationship with the Amnesty Act
4.4 Conclusion
CHAPTER FIVE THE ICC’S INTERVENTION IN THE LRA SITUATION
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Independence of the ICC Prosecutor
5.3 Victim or perpetrator
5.4 Arrest of LRA suspects
5.5 Withdrawal of ‘self-referral’ and complementarity
5.6 Reparations
5.7 Conclusion
CHAPTER SIX INTERNATIONAL CRIMES DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA: CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES
6.1 Introduction.
6.2 Applicable laws at the ICD
6.3 Retroactive application of legislation
6.4 Rules of procedure and evidence
6.5 Persons to be tried by the ICD
6.6 Prosecution as ordinary crimes in domestic courts
6.7 Territorial jurisdiction of the ICD
6.8 Penalties to be imposed by the ICD
6.9 Age of liability
6.10 Protection and participation of victims and witnesses
6.11 Reparations
6.12 Role of outreach
6.13 Conclusion
CHAPTER SEVEN 198CONDONING IMPUNITY? TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AS AN ACCOUNABILITY MEASURE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
CHAPTER EIGHT A TRUTH COMMISSION FOR UGANDA?
CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY