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Traditional and emerging middle powers
Jordaan (2003) adopts a neo-Gramscian approach to distinguish between traditional and emerging middle powers according to their positions in the international system. In a useful departure from the ‘material versus behavioural’ definitional debate, Jordaan argues that the constitutive (material) characteristics of middle powers inform their foreign policy behaviour.
Middle power internationalism is the pursuit of an activist foreign policy by interfering in issues beyond a state’s immediate sphere of influence; a preference for compromise solutions to international problems; and a preference for multilateral diplomacy. Middle powers are reluctant to challenge the global status quo either economically or politically’ and they value international law because it contributes to the stability and predictability of world order.
Jordaan (2003) identifies six differences between traditional and emerging middle powersdemocratic tradition; position in global economy; domestic distribution of wealth; regional position; regional orientation; and view on the international system. Jordaan (2003) defines traditional middle powers as states with established, stable, liberal or social democracies, and industrialised economies. They lie at the core of the global economy and have high levels of domestic income equality. This makes them ‘legitimisers’ of the global political economy because they seek to maintain their relatively privileged position. They do not try to transform the system to make it equal, but they make a major effort at mitigating global economic inequality through development aid. Middle powers like Sweden and Norway are among the most generous foreign aid donors, in terms of gross national income (Myers 2016). Some scholars argue that this is an external extension of their generous domestic social welfare systems (Jordaan 2003). Through humanitarian interventions, these middle powers aim to appease less-privileged states and critics of global inequality. Jordaan (2003: 176) describes appeasement as ‘the pacification and containment of potential threats to world order’. Traditional middle powers are not the most powerful states in their immediate geographic neighbourhood. This makes them more inclined to influencing the broader international system than their own regions. According to Jordaan (2003: 172) ‘traditional middle powers appear rather ambivalent about regional integration and cooperation’ and pursue an international identity independent from the dominant state in their region.
Conversely, emerging middle powers are recently democratised and lie in the semi-periphery of the global economy. They are proponents of reforming the rules, norms, and structures of the global political economy to make it more inclusive. They seek to improve their position in the global economy relative to states in the core. However, they refrain from advocating fundamental change in the political economy because of their relatively privileged regional position that gives them ‘competitive advantage’ over their neighbours that usually lie at the periphery of the global economy. Emerging middle powers are regional powers that use their regional influence to legitimise their interests in matters of global concern. Jordaan (2003) characterises this position as reformist and legitimising of the international system. Because of their semi-peripheral position, emerging middle powers do not have the financial resources to be major aid donors like traditional middle powers. Furthermore, they are preoccupied with ameliorating the high socio-economic inequality that characterises their societies. While they are rhetorically promoters of liberal values of democracy and human rights, the internationalism of emerging middle powers also has an anti-imperialist normative slant. This comes from their position in the semi-periphery of the international system and their histories of colonial and imperial oppression. Jordaan (2003: 167) excludes several non-Western states from the middle power category because they ‘deviate from hegemonic orthodoxy’. He excludes non-Western nuclear powers like China, India and Pakistan; states accused of sponsoring terrorism like Libya and Syria; so-called ‘economic deviants’ like China and Cuba; and states that do not prioritise spreading democracy in the world like Mexico and the majority of states in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia objectively fits the criteria of an emerging middle power but does not qualify as one because it refuses to participate in the UNSC and other international organisations and questions the legitimacy of the whole international system. The exclusion of India from Jordaan’s list of middle powers is an exception in the 21st century literature because in spite of its nuclear status, India is considered to promote stability and the norms of the dominant world order (Efthapolous 2011). Emerging middle powers display, what Du Bois (1994) called ‘double consciousness’: the condition of living a double life that comes from existing in two distinct social worlds. For Du Bois (1994) American blacks felt this sensation because of living in a society that devalued them and consequently needing to view themselves ‘through the eyes of others’. Similarly, emerging middle powers in the contemporary world order try to reconcile their status as intermediate states with substantial power resources with their relatively weak position in the context of structural power.
Middle power role typology
From the literature discussed above, I define middle powers as middle-sized states that play particular roles to stabilise and legitimise the extant world order. Middle powers are essentially status-quo powers whose aim is to ensure the sustainability and stability of the international system and create a predictable context for the pursuit of their national interests.
I identify eight middle power roles. Four roles are generally applicable to both traditional and emerging middle powers: policy entrepreneur; diplomatic broker; multilateral manager, and mediator. Two of the roles, good international citizen and example, are particularly associated with traditional middle powers. The final two roles are regional leader and champion of the South, both associated with emerging middle powers. The traditional middle power roles are consistent with these powers’ position at the core of structural power and their interest in promoting liberal norms and values. The emerging middle power roles are consistent with states that lie on the semi-periphery of the international system and so have a more ambivalent relationship with structural power. Emerging middle powers have relatively substantial capabilities but are constrained by the challenges they face as developing countries with highly unequal societies and high poverty levels. This leads them to challenge the status quo of structural power through regional leadership and championing the cause of the developing world.
Distinguishing between traditional and emerging middle powers allows us to provide a nuanced explanation of South Africa’s behaviour in the UNSC. South Africa was criticised for not behaving in a way associated with traditional middle powers by challenging the structure of power in the UNSC, promoting African solutions for the African conflicts on the agenda and defending the sovereignty of global South states over other considerations like human rights (Van Nieuwkerk 2007; Bischoff 2009; Jordaan 2010). Separating the characteristics and behaviours of different kinds of middle powers enables us to identify traditional and emerging middle powers by observing their actual foreign policy behaviour. This opens the possibility that states may reflect characteristics of both kinds of middle power at different times depending on the issue. Indeed, chapters four to seven of this study will demonstrate that South Africa played different middle power roles on different issues in the UNSC. In the first term it tended towards behaviour associated with emerging middle powers, while in the second term it tried to behave more consistently with traditional middle powers.
1.1 Identification of the research theme
1.2 Literature overview
1.3 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem
1.4 Research Methodology
1.5 Structure of the research
2.2 Defining middle powers
2.3 Traditional and emerging middle powers
2.4 Middle power role typology
2.5 Conclusion
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Foundations of South African foreign policy: Mandela’s foreign policy manifesto
3.3 The ANC’s internationalism
3.4 Interpreting South Africa’s foreign policy through the middle power role typology
3.5 Conclusion
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The global and domestic context of South Africa’s first term
4.3 Promotion of human rights and democracy
4.4 Commitment to rule of law
4.5 Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Peaceful resolution of conflict
5.3 African Agenda
5.4 Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The global and domestic context of South Africa’s second term
6.3 Promotion of human rights and democracy
6.4 Commitment to rule of law
6.5 Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Peaceful resolution of conflict
7.3 African Agenda
7.4 Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Analytical and theoretical framework of the study
8.3 Summary of findings
8.4 Implications for theory
8.5 Suggestions for further research
