MAINLAND CHINA’S REACTION TO LEE’S GUIDELINES FOR A SECESSIONIST POLICY

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Study Objectives

In the history of human civilization, since the emergence of dynasties and nations, secession and separation have existed. At the end of the twentieth century, secessionist groups existed in many places, for example the Basque secessionist movement in Spain, the Northern Irish secessionist movement in Britain, the Quebec separatist movement in Canada, the Kashmir separatist movement in Pakistan and the Taiwanese political Cross-Straits policy which was really a secessionist concept. However, the Taiwanese secessionism has been the most significant. It triggered the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which caused a military confrontation between Mainland China and the United States (US). During this crisis, Mainland China mobilised its nuclear submarines and the US mobilised two aircraft carrier battle groups.

Research Problem

In January 1988, Lee Teng-hui became President. Subsequently, in September 1990, the Presidential Office set up the National Unification Council, and in February 1991, Lee’s administration passed the Guidelines for National Unification. In so doing, Lee Teng-hui supported the unification policy superficially. However, the political Cross-Straits policies he adopted favoured secessionism substantively. Therefore, this gap between the nominal support for unification and the actual operation of secessionism made it difficult for many residents to believe that Lee Teng-hui was not a secessionist. On 30 September 1995, Lee Teng-hui publicly stated that he was absolutely not a secessionist, and he repeated that he was not a secessionist over 130 times (Yuan 1995:2). However, from 2001 to 2003, when Lee Teng-hui was a civilian, he publicly and frankly admitted that he was a secessionist (Su 2001:4), and stated that the ROC should change its name to Taiwan (Lin 2003a:1), and further indicated that the ROC had not existed (Lin 2003b:A4). Lee Teng-hui had only been paying lip-service to supporting Cross-Strait unification and really implemented a secessionist political Cross-Straits policy.

SECESSION AND SEPARATISM :

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK In the history of civilization, secession and separatism are enduring issues, and have occurred in both the East and West. Be it the Qing dynasty in the East, or the Ottoman Empire in the West, both faced and suffered the effects of secession and separatism, including wars during which an innumerable number of people died. In this chapter, secessionism and separatism, including how they differ from autonomy, self-determination and independence, are described. Secondly, the components of, and types of secession and separatism are analysed. Thirdly, this chapter explores what motivates secessionist movements. Fourthly, an overview is given of how separatists achieve their goal, in other words, what are the methods used by secessionist and separatist movements. Finally, the resolution of secessionist and separatist disputes are analysed.

Definition of secession

Secession, simply put, is one part of a country attempting to be an independent new nation. Robertson (1993:429-430) defines secession as “the attempt by some region in a political system to become independent of the rest of the state and rule itself as an autonomous nation.” Hechter (2000:78) states that “secession is the formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status.” Beran (1984:21) also states that secession is “the withdrawal, from an existing state and its central government, of part of this state, the withdrawing part consisting of citizens and the territory they occupy.” Buchanan (1991:10) further indicates that “the secessionist’s primary goal is not to overthrow the existing government, nor to make fundamental constitutional, economic, or sociopolitical changes within the existing state”. The definition of secession is usually related with the concepts of autonomy, self-determination and independence. Therefore, the relationship between secession and autonomy, self-determination, and independence must be further clarified. Separatism, as a concept, refers to some or other form of own identity or exclusiveness, and if linked to secessionism, implies independence in an own state.

Independence and secession

Generally speaking, the ultimate purpose of most secessionists is to secede from the jurisdiction of the existing central government, and establish an independent state. Nevertheless, in some special cases, secessionists may attempt to secede from one state in order to become part of another (for example, some Transylvanians endeavour to secede from Romania and become part of Hungary)(Buchanan 1991:10). The concept of secession, therefore, has a link with autonomy, self-determination, and independence. Strictly defined, they mean different things, but they also share common characteristics. For example, full autonomy may only differ from secession in name, and it is difficult to distinguish between the purpose of self-determination and the purpose of secession. Because the present situation of de facto secession between Taiwan and Mainland China resulted in civil war, and the present state of affairs between Taiwan and Mainland China resulting from Lee Teng-hui’s political Cross-Straits policy, it belongs in the domain of secession. This thesis, therefore, does not use terms such as autonomy, self-determination or independence, but rather uses the term ‘secession’.

Leadership and an organized movement

Because secession and separatism challenge an existing central government, the process of secession represents a dynamic struggle for people and territory against the central government. Premdas (1990:14) states that “if there is no struggle, there is no need for a movement. A secessionist struggle embodies action, tension and resistance.” Therefore, secessionists not only have leaders who lead supporters against the central government in order to withdraw from it, but also have a movement organized against the national structure of the existing state.

Central versus local secession

Depending on the extent of the secession, it could be categorized as national secession or local secession. With the exception of mini-states, all medium or large states have central governments and local governments. For example, the US has a federal government and fifty state local governments. In each state there are varying numbers of counties, which in turn contain numbers of municipalities (Buchanan 1991:15). Similarly, Mainland China has a central government and thirty-four administrative areas including provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS :

• Page
• INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER ONE: SECESSION AND SEPARATISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
  • 1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SECESSIONISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
  • 2. A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF SECESSION AND SEPARATISM
  • 2.1 Definition of secession
  • 2.2 Autonomy and secession
  • 2.3 Self-determination and secession
  • 2.4 Independence and secession
  • 3. COMPONENTS OF SECESSION AND SEPARATISM
  • 3.1 People
  • 3.2 Territory
  • 3.3 Leadership and an organized movement
  • 3.4 Motivation
  • 4. TYPES OF SECESSION AND SEPARATISM
  • 4.1 Majority versus minority secession
  • 4.2 Central versus local secession
  • 4.3 Voluntary versus coerced secession
  • 4.4 Rental versus long-term secession
  • 4.5 Divided versus de facto secession
  • 5. MOTIVATIONS FOR SECESSION AND SEPARATISM
  • 5.1 Religion
  • 5.2 Language
  • 5.3 Ethnic conflicts
  • 5.3.1 Ethnic group
  • 5.3.2 Ethnic identity shift to secession
  • 5.4 Ideology
  • 5.4.1 Resentment
  • 5.4.2 Political and economic systems
  • 5.5 Nationalism
  • 5.5.1 The nature of nationalism
  • 5.5.2 The shift from ethnic nationalism to secessionism
  • 6. METHODS OF SECESSION AND SEPARATISM
  • 6.1 Non-violence
  • 6.2 Violence
  • 6.3 International intervention
  • 6.3.1 Intangible international involvement
  • 6.3.2 Tangible international involvement
  • 7. SETTLEMENT OF SECESSION AND SEPARATISM
  • 7.1 Negotiated secession
  • 7.2 Responding to secession
  • 7.2.1 Improving the circumstances of disadvantaged minorities
  • 7.2.2 Adoption of asymmetric system or letting the minorities win
  • 7.3 Pathways of divided nations
  • 8. CONCLUSION
• CHAPTER TWO: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ROC UP TO
  • 1. THE RISE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
  • 1.1 The Japanese invasion
  • 1.2 The Joint Expedition of eight foreign powers
  • 1.3 The Republic of China
  • 2. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR BETWEEN THE KMT AND THE CCP
  • 2.1 The warlord period
  • 2.2 The founding of the Kuomintang (KMT)
  • 2.3 The birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
  • 2.4 The first cooperation and civil war between the KMT and the CCP
  • 2.4.1 The first cooperation between the KMT and the CCP
  • 2.4.2 The Northern Expedition
  • 2.4.3 The first war between the KMT and the CCP
  • 3. THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR
  • 3.1 The second cooperation between the KMT and the CCP
  • 3.2 The long-term Sino-Japanese War
  • 4. THE SECOND CIVIL WAR BETWEEN THE KMT AND THE CCP
  • 4.1 The second war between the KMT and the CCP
  • 4.2 The KMT-led government flees to Taiwan
  • 5. DE FACTO SECESSION AND THE DARK PERIOD
  • 5.1 Chiang Kai-shek rules the ROC again
  • 5.2 The Great Political Purge
  • 5.2.1 The State of Emergency
  • 5.2.2 A great political slaughter
  • 5.3 The dark political period
  • 6. THE PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK PERIOD
  • 6.1 Basis for election
  • 6.2 Economic miracle
  • 6.2.1 Economic legacies from Japanese colonisation
  • 6.2.2 Economic resources from Mainland China
  • 6.2.3 Hard work and thrifty habits of the Chinese people
  • 6.2.4 Aid from the US
  • 6.2.5 Agricultural land reform
  • 6.2.6 Correct decisions in strategic and economic planning
  • 7. THE PRESIDENT CHIANG CHING-KUO PERIOD
  • 7.1 Taiwanisation
  • 7.2 Political reform
  • 8. CONCLUSION
• CHAPTER THREE: A BACKGROUND STUDY OF LEE TENG-HUI
  • 1. JAPANESE COLONISATION
  • 1.1 Lee Teng-hui and his family
  • 1.2 The riddle of the birth of Lee Teng-hui
  • 1.2.1 Lee Teng-hui’s parentage
  • 1.2.2 Lee Teng-hui’s Japanese name
  • 1.2.3 Lee Teng-hui’s Japanese complex
  • 1.3 Middle School
  • 1.4 Taipei Higher School
  • 1.5 Kyoto Imperial University
  • 2. THE RECOVERY OF TAIWAN AND THE 228 INCIDENT
  • 2.1 Lee Teng-hui’s participation in the CCP
  • 2.1.1 Enrolment at National Taiwan University
  • 2.1.2 Lee Teng-hui participated in and left the CCP
  • 2.2 The 228 ( 28 February 1947 ) Incident
  • 2.3 Lee Teng-hui joined the NDCA
  • 2.4 Lee Teng-hui participated in and left the CCP again
  • 3. THE GREAT POLITICAL PURGE
  • 3.1 The first crisis of Lee Teng-hui
  • 3.2 The second crisis of Lee Teng-hui
  • 3.3 The third crisis of Lee Teng-hui
  • 3.4 The fourth crisis of Lee Teng-hui
  • 4. THE POLITICAL DARK PERIOD
  • 4.1 Lee Teng-hui surrendered himself to justice
  • 4.2 Working for the JCRR
  • 4.3 Detention
  • 4.4 Interrogation by the TGGH
  • 5. THE TAIWANISATION PERIOD
  • 5.1 Participation in the KMT
  • 5.2 Mayor of Taipei City
  • 5.3 From Governor to Vice-President
  • 6. LEE TENG-HUI’S POLITICAL VIEWS REGARDING MAINLANDERS AND THE KMT
  • 6.1 Ethnic resentment and power-sharing
  • 6.2 Ethnic resentment over language policy
  • 6.3 The true political views of Lee Teng-hui
  • 6.3.1 Lee Teng-hui concealed his hatred of Mainlanders for 40 years
  • 6.3.1.1 Lee Teng-hui revealed his real views to James R. Lilley
  • 6.3.1.2 The real political beliefs and intentions of Lee Teng-hui
  • 7. CONCLUSION
• CHAPTER FOUR: TAIWAN AND MAINLAND CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY
  • 1. THE IMMIGRANT LEADERS’ IDENTITY DURING THE LATE MING DYNASTY
  • 2. TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY DURING THE QING DYNASTY
  • 2.1 Immigrant society and the ethnic identity of Taiwan
  • 2.2 The civil service examination and Taiwanese consciousness
  • 2.2.1 The civil service examination during the Qing dynasty
  • 2.2.2 The civil service examination increased local consciousness
  • 2.3 Domestic trade and Taiwanese consciousness
  • 2.4 Taiwanese identification with China
  • 2.4.1 Taiwanese militia in the Opium War
  • 2.4.2 Taiwanese militia in the Sino-French War
  • 2.4.3 Taiwanese militia against Japanese aggression
  • 3. TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY DURING THE JAPANESE PERIOD
  • 3.1 Taiwanese political identity in the early Japanese colonial period
  • 3.1.1 Armed resistance
  • 3.1.2 Clandestine anti-Japanese movement
  • 3.1.3 Anti-Japanese political activities
  • 3.2 Separate education system and Taiwanese national identity
  • 3.2.1 Common school (elementary school)
  • 3.2.2 Post-primary school and university
  • 3.2.3 Discrimination against Taiwanese students
  • 3.2.4 Chinese poetry societies
  • 3.3 Japanisation movement and the Taiwanese national identity
  • 3.3.1 Coercing Taiwanese to worship the Japanese god
  • 3.3.2 Destroying Chinese temples and building Japanese shrines
  • 3.3.3 Japanising Taiwanese Chinese names
  • 3.3.4 Promoting the Japanese language
  • 4. TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ROC ON TAIWAN
  • 4.1 The KMT-led Government
  • 4.1.1 Japanese cultural prohibition
  • 4.1.2 National language policy
  • 4.1.3 Cultural Rebuilding Movement
  • 4.1.4 Chinese Cultural Renaissance
  • 4.1.5 Chinese cultural education
  • 4.2 Ethnic identity shift to national identity
  • 4.2.1 Democracy and national identity
  • 4.2.2 The rise of the next generation of Taiwanese
  • 4.2.3 Democracy and the Kaohsiung Incident
  • 4.2.4 Democracy and secessionism
  • 4.3 Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwanese identity movement
  • 5. MAINLAND CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY
  • 5.1 Eternity of Chinese civilisation
  • 5.1.1 Homogeneity of Chinese characters
  • 5.1.2 A comprehensive ideology of unification
  • 5.2 Chinese patriotic education
  • 5.3 Mainland China’s national identity
  • 5.4 Pursuing unification in China
  • 6. CONCLUSION
• CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEE TENG-HUI’S POLITICAL CROSS-STRAITS POLICY
  • 1. THE CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONSHIP FROM THE 1950s TO THE 1980s
  • 1.1 Armed conflict period (1950-1958)
  • 1.2 Semi-armed conflict period (1959-1978)
  • 1.3 Peaceful confrontation period (1979-1987)
  • 2. LEE TENG-HUI’S POLITICAL CROSS-STRAITS POLICY OF SEPARATION (early period after 1988)
  • 2.1 ADB event
  • 2.2 NUC, MAC and SEF
  • 2.3 Guidelines for National Unification
  • 2.4 The separation purpose of the guidelines and institutions
  • 3. CROSS-STRAIT TALKS
  • 3.1 « One China, with respective interpretations »
  • 3.2 The Cross-Strait Koo-Wang Talks
  • 4. THE CHINQDAO-LAKE INCIDENT
  • 4.1 Taiwan authorities’ manipulation behind the scenes
  • 4.2 Lee Teng-hui slams Mainland China
  • 5. SORROW AT BEING BORN TAIWANESE
  • 5.1 Private dialogue between Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro
  • 5.2 Reaction to the dialogue of Lee Teng-hui
  • 6. THE SIX-POINT PROPOSAL OF LEE TENG-HUI
  • 7. THE VISIT TO CORNELL UNIVERSITY
  • 7.1 The US allowed President Lee’s visit
  • 7.2 The influence of President Lee’s speech
  • 8. THE SPECIAL STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONSHIP
  • 8.1 The design and announcement of the special state-to-state relationship
  • 8.2 The reaction to the special state-to-state relationship
  • 8.2.1 The reaction of the Taiwan residents
  • 8.2.2 The reaction of the US
  • 8.2.3 The failure of the special state-to-state relationship
  • 9. CONCLUSION
• CHAPTER SIX: THE REACTION OF MAINLAND CHINA
  • 1. THE REACTION OF MAINLAND CHINA TO THE CROSSSTRAITS ISSUE FROM THE 1950s TO THE 1970s
  • 1.1 US forces’ occupation of Taiwan
  • 1.2 Quemoy artillery battle
  • 1.3 US forces withdraw from Taiwan
  • 2. DENG XIAOPING AND « ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS »
  • 3. MAINLAND CHINA’S REACTION TO LEE’S INITIAL SECESSIONIST POLICY
  • 3.1 Mainland China’s reaction to Taiwan’s Guidelines for National Unification
  • 3.2 Mainland China’s reaction to Taiwan’s termination of the « Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion »
  • 3.3 Mainland China’s reaction to the Wang-Koo Talks
  • 4. MAINLAND CHINA’S REACTION TO LEE’S GUIDELINES FOR A SECESSIONIST POLICY
  • 4.1 Mainland China’s reaction to the dialogue between LeeTeng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro
  • 4.2 Jiang Zemin’s eight-point proposal
  • 5. MAINLAND CHINA’S REACTION TO LEE’S VISIT TO CORNELL UNIVERSITY
  • 5.1 Criticism of Lee Teng-hui’s address at Cornell University
  • 5.2 Mainland China’s missile exercise in
  • 5.3 Mainland China’s missile exercise in
  • 5.3.1 Mainland China’s missile launches
  • 5.3.2 US sends aircraft carrier battle groups to Taiwanese waters
  • 5.3.3 Mainland China mobilises nuclear submarines
  • 6. MAINLAND CHINA’S REACTION TO THE TWO-STATE THEORY
  • 7. CONCLUSION
• CHAPTER SEVEN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL CROSSSTRAITS POLICY
  • 1. POLITICAL-CULTURAL CROSS-STRAITS POLICY
  • 1.1 The revision of historical textbooks
  • 1.2 The promotion of mother language course
  • 1.3 Non-recognition of Mainland Chinese qualifications
  • 2. POLITICAL-TRADE CROSS-STRAITS POLICY
  • 2.1 Trade development across the Taiwan Strait
  • 2.2 Go South and No Haste, Be Patient policies
  • 2.3 Mainland China’s economic rise and Taiwan’s economic marginalisation
  • 3. ACCEPTABILITY OF « ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS »
  • 4. POLITICAL-MILITARY CROSS-STRAITS POLICY
  • 4.1 Taiwan’s procurement of advanced weapons
  • 4.2 Mainland China’s military modernisation
  • 4.2.1 Mainland China’s air force and navy
  • 4.2.2 Mainland China’s nuclear capability and ballistic missiles
  • 4.2.3 Mainland China’s outer space capability
  • 5. CONCLUSION
• CHAPTER EIGHT: EVALUATION
  • 1. SUMMARY
  • 2. TESTING OF PROPOSITIONS
  • 2.1 Proposition 1: The main cause of Taiwanese secessionism was ethnic conflict
  • 2.2 Proposition 2: Lee Teng-hui’s secessionist ideology reflected a hatred toward Mainlanders
  • 2.3 Proposition 3: Lee Teng-hui disguised his secessionist aims as unification
  • 3. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE TRENDS
  • BIBLIOGRAPHY
  • SUMMARY
  • OPSOMMING
  • KEY TERMS

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LEE TENG-HUI’S POLITICAL CROSS-STRAITS POLICY AND MAINLAND CHINA’S REACTION