Old and new migration trends between Zimbabwe and South Africa

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CHAPTER III THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS AS A CAUSE OF THE MIGRATION OF TEACHERS

Introduction

This chapter explores the unfolding of what is now commonly known as the ‘Zimbabwean crisis’, factors leading to the crisis, and its consequences including the mass exodus of the 2000s in which professionals such as teachers were also involved. This is necessary in order to place the Zimbabwean teachers’ immigration to South Africa into its broader context as well as improve the reader’s understanding of developments in the country during this time. The discussion of the crisis also highlights the link between economic growth and social development since the devastating effects of the economic crisis were most visible in the social sectors including health and education (Murisa, 2010). Furthermore, the Zimbabwean crisis exposes the nexus between state policies and economic development proving the extent to which the state is still a formidable force in the economy especially in countries of the South. Finally, the crisis shows the nature of human beings particularly their tendency to escape from undesirable and life threatening circumstances or simply seeking to improve their lives.

Zimbabwe before the crisis

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country bordered by Mozambique on the east, Zambia on the north, Botswana west, and South Africa south (Fig.3.1). She is a founding member of the regional developmental cooperation of countries called the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Zimbabwe is a former British colony and achieved independence from the British through an armed struggle in April 1980.
Like in most former colonies, the Zimbabwean government inherited a country that was characterised by inequalities among races as well as between rural and urban areas. One major source of inequality between the majority black Zimbabweans and their minority white counterparts was in the ownership of land, which was skewed in favour of the whites. The land issue, as it is commonly called, was at the centre of the economic and political crisis that occurred in the country after 2000. In the 1997-2007 National Health Strategy, the Ministry of Health (MoH, 1997:3) reported, “commercial farmers (mostly whites) owned on average 100 times more land than small-scale farmers (all black) in 1976. While 77% of land suitable for intensive agriculture was allocated to whites, the bulk of the population lived in drought prone areas with poor soils …”
This unequal appropriation of land between blacks and whites is blamed on the imperialistic Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and other Acts of a White-dominated Parliament, which led to the formation of communal areas (former Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) or ‘reserves’) where millions of black Zimbabweans eke a living out of barren and exhausted soils. “This Act alienated considerable tracts of land from Africans so that by 1963 only 50,000 square miles were set aside for the use and occupation of 2,630,000 Africans, against 75,000 square miles for some 215,000 Europeans” (Gann, 1963).
Racial inequalities in land ownership as well as resource inequalities between rural areas, where the majority black Zimbabweans lived, and urban areas accounted for most of the disparities in social development indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality rates (IMR), school enrolment rates, and literacy rates between these sub-groups. For instance, in 1979, IMR was 14 infant deaths per 1000 births for whites, 40 for blacks living in Harare and 146 for blacks in rural areas (MoH, 1997:3). Such inequalities in the ownership of resources as well as other concerns regarding White rule, formed the background of Zimbabwe’s liberation war that culminated in the country’s independence in April 1980 (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010).
Armed with the zeal to reverse the inequalities of the colonial regime, the newly elected ZANU-PF led government of Zimbabwe made concerted efforts to redress the previous inequalities especially during the first decade of independence (1980-90). The first Chapter of this thesis cited Kanyongo’s (2005) reported on how the government expanded the entire education system to include remote rural areas through building new schools, training teachers and forming two ministries responsible for basic and higher education. Consequently, access to education for most Zimbabweans significantly improved and eventually the system produced professionals including teachers, nurses and doctors (ibid).
In the health sector, the government expanded infrastructure and training of nurses and doctors as well as developed new health management systems in previously under-serviced rural areas (MoH, 1997:5). These transformations were supported by the necessary resources since government’s spending in health shot up by 94% in real terms and 48% in real per capita terms between 1979 and 1987 (MoH, 1997:12). Because of these efforts, life expectancy, IMR and nutrition indicators dramatically improved. For example, the IMR for rural areas decreased from 88 infant deaths per 1000 births in 1978 to 69 in 1988. While about 21% of children had low weight for age in 1980, 11% in 1985 were below the line (MoH, 1997:8).
Regarding the economy, agriculture formed the backbone of the country’s vibrant economy. This is reflected in the African Development Bank’s 1998 figures, which showed that while 65.8% of the Zimbabwean labour force was in agriculture, only 20.1% was in services and a meagre 14.1% in industry (Sachikonye, 1998:x). Furthermore, agriculture supported most of the manufacturing industries since most of them were agriculturally based (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). Agriculture was diversified including the production of cereals such as maize and wheat, tobacco, beef and milk. Tobacco, mining and tourism were the top foreign currency earners for the country particularly in the 1980s (Mashingaidze, 2006). Manufacturing employed 16.5% of all those in the formal economy and contributed 24.8% of GDP in 1990, about three times higher than most African countries (Zeilig, 2002).
There is evidence to support the argument that the economy was performing well in the 1980s. Figures provided by the World Bank in 1998 for the 1980-90 period, indicated an annual average growth rate of 3.0% in the gross domestic product (GDP) (Sachikonye, 1998:x). Compared with other SADC countries, Zimbabwe’s annual average GDP growth rate was position four out of ten countries, coming after Botswana (10.3%), Lesotho (4.3%) and Angola (3.7%) (Sachikonye, 1998:x). In comparison with the rest of African countries, Zimbabwe had fairly well developed industrial and agricultural sectors (Zeilig, 2002). The country also used to have a relatively developed infrastructure including a good network of tarred roads, which is in an advanced state of deterioration now due to lack of maintenance following the crisis.
Because of the country’s well performing economy and impressive social development indicators, Zimbabwe was held in high esteem in both the SADC region and the African continent as a whole. In the SADC region, Zimbabwe was given the responsibility for food security in the region hence, branded the ‘breadbasket’ of the region (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). The term ‘breadbasket’ came about when Zimbabwe was given the responsibility of ensuring the availability of enough food stocks in the SADC region (Murisa, 2010:4). Mashingaidze (2006:58) commented that during this time, Zimbabwe used to be described as the ‘African jewel’ because of a highly performing economy as well as strong currency, which was stronger than the United States dollar. Because of Zimbabwe’s “high profile foreign policy and effective domestic management record”, president Mugabe won international prizes such as the 1988 World Freedom against Hunger Award (ibid: 58). In addition, the country was a major recipient of international aid and several international organisations set up their regional headquarters in Harare during this period (1980s).
All the achievements of the 1980s were reversed a decade or two later when the crisis started. Indicators in education, health and the economy plummeted to pre-independence levels. For example, Mashingaidze (2006:61) quoted the US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Christopher Dell, saying “… the purchasing power of the average Zimbabweans in 2005 had fallen back to the same levels as in 1953 when the Confederation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established.” There is consensus in the literature on the timing of the beginning of the crisis, which is around 1990. But, Mashingaidze (2006) placed the beginning of the crisis around mid 1990s. Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) argued that although the crisis started earlier, its recent manifestations are associated with recent political and economic developments in the country at the dawn of the new millennium (2000).

Causes and dimensions of the crisis

The causes of the Zimbabwean crisis are complex, inter-tangled, and sometimes debatable. Although there is consensus in the literature that the causes are found in the political and economic developments in the country since the mid 1990s, it is not easy sometimes to separate the initial causes from ripple effects of a “gradually dysfunctional state” (ibid:1). Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) argued that the Zimbabwean crisis actually involved a series of crises. The crisis has occurred over a prolonged period, more than a decade now and its effects have been so marked and devastating for everyone outside the country to notice. For instance, massive out-migration from the country in the 2000s was enough evidence of a crisis at home.
There is no consensus on the exact causes of the crisis with the ZANU-PF led government of Zimbabwe and its allies blaming the crisis on the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and its western allies, and the western countries particularly the USA and UK blaming the ZANU-PF government’s policies for the crisis. Many authors are of the view that the crisis was due to the ZANU-PF led government’s economic and political policies among which was the ruling party’s recourse to violence as a strategy to suppress the opposition (McGregor, 2006; Clemens and Moss, 2005; Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009; and Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). Some of the allies of the ZANU-PF led government such as South Africa admire President Mugabe for standing up against western countries, who in the eyes of many African leaders try to dictate policies for other countries (UN, 2009).
Despite the divergent views on the exact causes of the crisis, three dimensions to the crisis can be identified in most of the literature including the political, economic and social dimensions (Murisa, 2010). As argued in the introduction to this chapter, these three dimensions are interrelated since the events that occurred in the political arena had repercussions on both the economic and social sectors. The political dimension include government’s inability to curb corruption, which involved some of its members, the prioritization of some political and sometimes autocratic decisions despite their being detrimental to the economy, resorting to violence in order to suppress the opposition, and disputes with regard to election results and the rule of law (Murisa, 2010:3). On the economic front, the government’s adoption of the market-based economic reforms in 1991 set the pace for the economic meltdown and the effects of this economic policy were exacerbated by the mismanagement of the economy, declining foreign direct investment and the closure of local and multi-national companies (ibid:3). The social dimension, which includes the disintegration of the social service delivery system, was mainly a response to the crisis that was initially caused by economic and political policies and yet it led to the further severity of the crisis.
The thesis now focuses initially on the political dimension and lastly on the social dimension of the crisis. While the government significantly attempted to redress the inequalities of the colonial regime in many sectors including health and education, little was done in the 1980s on redistributing land to the majority Black population, which was the main reason for the armed struggle. This was partly because government’s acquisition of land previously owned by White commercial farmers, which was based on the ‘willing seller’ principle, led to the slow acquisition of land for redistribution to the majority black Zimbabweans. Corruption in the redistribution process also contributed to the snail’s pace of the land redistribution process especially given that some government officials besides undeserving of resettlement were actually allocated more than one farm (Council for a Community of Democracies, 2010). Muzondidya (2009:183) reported for this period between 1980 and 1990 that government was being criticized particularly by academics for failing to curb corruption in both government and society, for condoning a culture of injustice, violation of democratic rights and continued inequalities in ownership of land and the economy. Partly due to the perpetuation of corruption, Zimbabwe has been described as one of the world’s most unequal societies with less than 5% of the population (including black and white families and businesses) owning almost 70% of the country’s income (Zeilig, 2002).
In the late 1990s, the ZANU-PF led government made two autocratic decisions that had significant negative effects on the economy. Firstly, the government untimely decided to recognize belatedly the veterans of the liberation struggle that ended in 1980 through unbudgeted for payouts of Z$50,000 gratuities and Z$2,000 monthly pensions for each war veteran in October 1997 (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010:2). Secondly, within a short space of time, President Mugabe unilaterally decided to prop up the government of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which was at war with Rwandan and Ugandan supported rebels (ibid). Mashingaidze (2006:56) recounted, “At its height in 2000, the DRC military venture drained at least US$1 million per day.” By 2002, the DRC military venture involved 15,000 troops, a quarter of the entire Zimbabwean army. This military venture benefitted a few army generals and businessmen, who were rewarded with contracts on mines and logging companies (Zeilig, 2002). Hence, Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) argued that the DRC military intervention destabilised the fiscus and Mashingaidze (2006) called it one of the major causes of the crisis.
Literature suggests that government’s policies, mismanagement of the economy and corruption led to the formation of a hitherto only strong opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The previous developments including the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), war veterans’ payouts and the DRC military intervention increased discontentment among workers and civil society, hence the formation of the MDC (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010; Zeilig, 2002). The MDC emerged from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) representing workers and its composition included leaders of the ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda, “industrialists and white farmers, smaller pressure groups and left wing parties” (Zeilig, 2002:3). The appearance of this new party on the political scene and that it nearly toppled the violent regime in the June 2000 parliamentary elections where it obtained 57 out of 120 seats seemed a threat to the ruling ZANU-PF. The new party had also joined forces with civil society that is, the National Constitution Assembly (NCA), to oppose the government’s proposed new constitution, which gave more powers to President Mugabe including seizing White-owned land, during a constitutional referendum in February 2000 (Mashingaidze, 2006).
The emergence of the MDC is said to have created a sense of panic in the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and forced it to change its campaigning strategies (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010: 2). New strategies designed to revive the ruling party included fighting back the opposition together with its allies (white farmers) through violence and seizing white-owned land in a chaotic land reform programme (ibid:59). This aggressive land reform programme dubbed the ‘fast track’ land reform programme started in 2000 and was orchestrated by a ‘loosely organised group of war veterans’ (U.S Bureau of African Affairs, 2011) or party thugs since some of them were too young to have fought in the war of independence (Council for a Community of Democracies, 2010). This programme was characterized by “forced expulsion of white farmers and violence against both farmers and farm employees” (U.S Bureau of African Affairs, 2011). Analysts argued that the ‘fast track’ land reform programme was initiated in order to help the ruling party regain its lost popularity since it was twenty years after independence and yet pre-independence inequalities in land ownership had not been fully addressed. At the same time, the ruling party used the land grabbing exercise as a weapon for destroying the opposition (MDC), which ZANU-PF was convinced it was “a front for whites, particularly white farmers” (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010:2). Clemens and Moss (2005) reasoned that it was not by coincidence that the economy started to fall at the same time that ZANU-PF initiated and perpetuated violence against the opposition and white farmers. “… The forcible appropriation of commercial farms seems calculated to undermine the financial and popular support of the opposition”, (Clemens and Moss, 2005:4).
As in other former colonies characterised by unequal distribution of land or other resources, land redistribution was necessary. But it is the chaotic way in which it was done that made the Zimbabwean government receive many critics and caused the country to plunge into economic and social deterioration. The expropriation of land without compensation, which President Mugabe explicitly stated following his re-election into office in 1996 (Council for a Community of Democracies, 2010:3), has been the most criticised policy particularly by western countries. Murisa (2010:3) argued that the ‘fast track’ land reform programme has been criticised on the basis that it deviated from “acceptable norms of transfer of property”. Hence, Zimbabwe’s former colonial master, Britain, which was in support of land redistribution based on the ‘willing seller’ principle, responded to the land seizures and the associated human rights abuses with a “number of punitive measures, including ending arms shipments to Zimbabwe and cutting its financial aid to the Zimbabwean government” in 2000 (UN, 2009:6).
On the other hand, the Zimbabwean government has accused the former colonial power and its allies such as the United States of America (USA) of trying to meddle in its domestic affairs. The Zimbabwean government claimed that Britain, “in support of white farmers, has been trying to force regime change in Zimbabwe” (UN, 2009:6). With ties that date long back during the liberation struggles for the two countries, black South Africans feel solidarity with Zimbabwe although they might not agree in total with the policies taken by the Zimbabwean government. Admiring President Mugabe for standing up against western countries, who many African leaders feel they try to dictate policies for other countries, most black South African leaders were unwilling to criticise the Zimbabwean government’s policies (UN, 2009). In fact, South Africa has reliably supported Zimbabwe throughout the crisis period via formal imports and exports, trade of Zimbabweans who cross the border to buy or sell goods, and providing essential goods and services (ibid). In this way, South Africa has also helped to slow down the rate of deterioration of the economic and social situation in Zimbabwe.
Besides the land invasions, the period leading to the March 2002 disputed presidential elections was also characterised by intense violence and intimidation of the opposition (MDC) supporters, which resulted in the loss of 50 lives mostly opposition supporters (U.S Bureau of African Affairs, 2011). President Mugabe emerged as the winner with 56% of the votes against 42% for the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. But the results of this election were unacceptable to the international community as the election was ruled as not free and fair. The consequences of the 2002 election included the imposition of travel restrictions against senior Zimbabwean officials and the embargo on the sale of arms to Zimbabwe by the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU) and other European countries. The USA and EU also froze the financial assets of selected government officials and the Commonwealth suspended the country from its council meetings (U.S Bureau of African Affairs, 2011).
Analysts including Mashingaidze (2006) described the ruling party’s violence and intimidation of the opposition supporters as tantamount to political intolerance. Ideologically, the ruling party viewed the opposition, MDC, as having alliance with white farmers in Zimbabwe and western countries, and as “outside genuine nationalist aspirations. … The ruling elite have strong elements of sectarian and totalitarian approaches to nationhood. They cannot tolerate political plurality and harness diversity for development. Citizens who do not belong to and identify with the ruling party ZANU-PF and did not participate in the liberation struggle are vilified as unpatriotic and traitors without rights to participate in the Zimbabwean body politic” (Mashingaidze, 2006:59). The former army general, Vitalis Zvinavashe, was reported to have openly refused to “recognize a government led by a person who is not a veteran of the war of independence, ruling out the opposition” (Zeilig, 2002).
Towards the disputed 2002 Presidential elections, the ruling party (ZANU-PF) also passed a series of repressive laws in order to consolidate its power among which were the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection Privacy Act (AIPPA) (Mashingaidze, 2006:62). POSA carried “the death penalty for acts of insurgency, banditry, sabotage and terrorism” (Zeilig, 2002). Furthermore, both laws were selectively applied as journalists from privately owned media only and supporters of the opposition were arrested based on violating either AIPPA or POSA1, respectively (Mashingaidze, 2006:63). Privately owned newspapers like the Daily News, The Tribune and The Weekly Times were closed for violating these laws, while the government monopolized the media through its control of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ibid:63). AIPPA and POSA were laws that “curtailed free speech, free press, and rights of assembly” (U.S Bureau of African Affairs, 2011). On the basis of these laws, opposition leaders including Morgan Tsvangirai, Welshman Ncube and Gasela were tried for treason in March 2003 and these charges were later dropped for all of them. In addition to the political environment after 2002 becoming increasingly tense and extremely polarised, the economy further melted down.
The violence against the opposition and the repression of freedom of expression led the Commonwealth Election Observer team to refuse to endorse the June 2000 Parliamentary elections on the basis that conditions were not favourable for democratic participation. This further chased investors from Zimbabwe and contributed to the further downfall of the economy. There was also fear among investors that the government might also seize their properties in the same way as the land seizures. “Besides uncertainties in the land sector in 2002, some government supporters threatened to seize industries in a replica of the land seizures.” (Mashingaidze, 2006:62)
The setup of Youth Militia camps around 2002 popularly known as the ‘Border Gezi’ camps is also worth mentioning. The Militia camps were aimed at indoctrinating the youth so that “they fully appreciate their country and stand by it in times of crisis” (Zeilig, 2002). But the products of these Youth Militia camps were notoriously known for their participation in acts of violence against members of the opposition (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2011). Prior to the 2005 Parliamentary elections, which the ruling party also lost to the opposition, the government again aggressively and without notice cleared slum dwellings in Zimbabwe’s urban and peri-urban areas (U.S Bureau of African Affairs, 2011; UNDP, 2010). This programme called ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ or ‘Operation Restore Order’, destroyed the homes of about 700,000 people and “thousands of families were left unprotected in the open in the middle of Zimbabwe’s winter” (U.S Bureau of African Affairs, 2011). This further increased the ruling party’s unpopularity especially in urban areas and contributed to increased migration.
While the 2000 parliamentary and the 2002 presidential elections were marred with violence and repression of the opposition, the March 2008 parliamentary elections occurred with little violence and were mediated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Raftopoulos, 2009). The opposition, MDC led by Tsvangirai, won the parliamentary elections with 109 seats as compared to 97 seats for the ruling party, ZANU-PF. But, the March 2008 presidential elections did not have a decisive winner with a “50% plus one” majority, making a run-off election necessary (ibid). Raftopoulos (2009) argued that the violence that took place prior to the run-off election at the end of June 2008 was responsible for further political uncertainty. This violence was targeted on the electorate, particularly in rural areas, as punishment for the ruling party’s loss in March 2008 election and a “warning against the repeat of such a vote” (Raftopoulos, 2009:222). Most of the violence occurred in the three Mashonaland provinces (East, Central and West), which were former strongholds of ZANU-PF. The major opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, finally withdrew from running for the presidency in the run-off election citing violence (Raftopoulos, 2009).
The political dimension of the crisis reviewed above clearly shows the ruling party’s constant recourse to violence in order to silence the opposition as well as consolidating its power. In a book entitled, When a State Turns on its Citizens: Institutionalised Violence and Political Culture, Sachikonye (2011) recounted how violence has characterised Zimbabwean politics for over a century now. The same violence, which was condoned, initiated and sponsored by the state, has been the weapon used by the state during the period leading to elections since 2000 as well as during the fast track land reform programme. Sachikonye (2011:87) reported that fewer than 1,000 Zimbabweans, including members of the opposition party and civil society such as teachers, have been killed in this violence since 2000. In spite of this seemingly low number of victims, this state sponsored violence has been witnessed by a larger proportion of the Zimbabwean population with the result that it has created a “society traumatized by fear, withdrawal and collective depression based on past memories of violence, intimidation and harassment” (ibid:87).
The origins of the economic dimension of the crisis can be traced back to 1990 when the ZANU-PF led government adopted the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP). The introduction of ESAP marked government’s change of policy from “state-based economic development to a market-based approach” (Murisa, 2010:5). Since government had high expenditure due to the redressing of social inequalities in the first decade of independence, it was forced to adopt ESAP in 1991 on influence from the Bretton Woods Institutions that is, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Most of the literature agrees that the government’s adoption of ESAP as well as other economically irrational policies should have initiated the crisis. Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) argued that economic policies contributed to the disastrous state of the crisis and topping the list of such economic policies was ESAP. Instead of improving the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and efficiently relocating labour in line with neo-liberal economics, ESAP actually achieved the opposite. It resulted in “de-industrialisation, growing unemployment and the severe erosion of living standards of the majority” (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010:2). There is evidence that the economy performed badly during and soon after the implementation of ESAP, which was between 1991 and 1995. World Bank statistics for 1998 cited by Sachikonye (1998:x) indicated an average annual GDP growth rate of 1.3% between 1990 and 1996 as compared to 3.0% for the 1980-90 period.
The downsizing and closure of some companies that started with ESAP continued as well as worsened after the political turmoil of the 2000s including the series of disputed elections, the criticised ‘fast track’ land reform programme, and violence against the opposition. As a result, the once vibrant and diversified economy collapsed heavily (Clemens and Moss, 2005). Mashingaidze (2006) observed that Zimbabwe is the only non-war economy that experienced such a dramatic economic decline. GDP dropped by 40% starting in 1997 and this drop was associated with a 51% decline in manufacturing and 50% in exports. Unsurprisingly, this decline occurred mainly in the foreign currency earning industries such as mining, tourism and tobacco production. It is estimated that 400 companies closed down operations between 2000 and 2006 (Mashingaidze, 2006:61). By 2007, exports contributed only 9.9% of GDP as compared to 33.5% in 1997 (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010).

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Dedication
Declaration
Summary
List of tables
List of figures
List of Abbreviations
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Old and new migration trends between Zimbabwe and South Africa
1.2 Successes and challenges of the Zimbabwean education system
1.3 Successes and challenges of the South African education system
1.4 The research problem
1.5 Purpose and objectives of the study
1.6 Research design and methodology
1.7 Overview of chapters
1.8 Chapter conclusion
CHAPTER II: DETERMINANTS OF THE BRAIN DRAIN: LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Theoretical perspectives in international migration
2.3 Trends and impacts of the brain drain
2.4 Causes of the brain drain
2.4.1 Supply-push factors
2.4.2 Demand-pull factors
2.4.3 Mitigating or intervening factors
2.5 Importance of the study
2.6 Chapter conclusion
CHAPTER III: THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS AS A CAUSE OF THE MIGRATION OF TEACHERS
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Zimbabwe before the crisis
3.3 Causes and dimensions of the crisis
3.4 The crisis as a cause of the mass exodus
3.5 The crisis as a cause of teacher migration
3.6 Chapter conclusion
CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Research design
4.3 Conceptualisation and operationalisation of key variables
4.4 Sample design and sampling methods
4.5 Data collection and fieldwork
4.6 Data capturing and editing
4.7 Statistical techniques and data analysis
4.8 Shortcomings and errors
4.9 Chapter conclusion
CHAPTER V: SAMPLE PROFILES
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Personal characteristics of migrant and non-migrant teachers
5.3 Migrant teachers in South Africa
5.4 Chapter conclusion
CHAPTER VI: DEMAND-PULL AND MITIGATION FACTORS
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Demand-pull factors
6.3 Mitigation factors
6.4 Chapter conclusion
CHAPTER VII: SUPPLY-PUSH FACTORS
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Migration and crisis in the social sector
7.3 Migration and life under the economic crisis
7.4 Migration and the political crisis
7.5 Reasons for non-migration and migration
7.6 Chapter conclusion
CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Summary
8.3 Conclusions from literature study
8.4 Conclusions from empirical investigation
8.5 Recommendations and suggestions
8.6 Concluding comments
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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