POLITICAL LffiERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL STABILITY

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A Convincing Alternative Scenario?

Political liberals suggest that there is an alternative to the above scenario. Rather than believe that the emergence of a conflict between one’s fundamental values and the political conception of justice necessitates that one either support said values and reject the political conception of justice, or maintain his support for the political conception of justice and forsake said values, political liberals contend that citizens confronted by such a conflict »might » simply choose to « adjust or revise »theirdoctrinesratherthanrejectthepoliticalconceptionofjustice(Rawls 1993: 160; see also Larmore 1996: 142). But if the concern for political stability is a practical concern, then surely it is insufficient merely to suggest that citizens might choose to modify their comprehensive doctrines rather than reject the political conception of justice. As Thomas Hill has noted, « If the point oflooking for arguments for stability is to see, before we attempt reforms, whether the reforms would be lasting enough to be worth the effort, then a bare possibility is a small comfort » (1994: 341 ). Moreover, as Michael Huemer (among others) has suggested, when faced with such a conflict, individuals are just as likely to qualify or withdraw, even if only temporarily, their support for the political conception of justice as they are to attempt to accommodate it by modifying their comprehensive doctrines (Huemer 1996; see also Klosko 1993: 352-53). Indeed, it is difficult to fathom why anyone who believes that his comprehensive doctrine represents the truth-as most, if not all, individuals do-would even consider adjusting or revising it simply so that it can become or remain morally compatible with the public conception of justice. Even if we restrict our focus to the domain of the political, it remains unclear why any person would or should willingly subordinate what he perceives to be the »whole » truth, in favour of something less « complete. »
Political liberals seem to believe that in the case of a conflict between one’s fundamental values and the political conception of justice, all reasonable persons will be willing to adjust or revise their comprehensive doctrines because 1) they recognise that establishing a well-ordered society will secure the greatest opportunity for all to pursue and (hopefully) live the life that they choose; and 2) they realise that the establishment and preservation of a well-ordered society requires the achievement of an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice, and this is impossible if one makes truth the supreme standard of judgment for public matters (Rawls 1999: 132-3 3, 13 8). Hence, desiring a well-ordered society or the benefits thereof, reasonable citizens will accept reasonableness as the supreme standard of judgment for public matters because they understand that only by doing so is it possible to achieve the required public agreement and corresponding political stability. This acceptance of reasonableness as the « final court of appeal » for public matters ensures that should a conflict arise between one’s fundamental values and the political conception of justice, citizens will readily consider adjusting or revising their comprehensive doctrines rather than simply withdrawing their support for the political conception of justice.
This assumption is grounded in the belief that, generally speaking, the citizens of contemporary liberal democracies realise that such polities will always contain a plurality of conflicting and irreconcilable reasonable comprehensive doctrines (i.e., they affirm the fact of reasonable disagreement). This realisation is accompanied by a belief that it is unreasonable and detrimental-to the extent that it is divisive and destabilising and thus an impediment to the achievement of one’s goals-to demand that all citizens abide by a single understanding of the truth. In other words, among the citizenry of contemporary liberal democracies, there already exists an adequate, stable consensus on what constitutes a reasonable demand. This consensus is present in the form of a pervasive, conscious and subconscious, explicit and implicit, support for what Rawls has termed fundamental ideas. 10 However, as has already been noted, empirical data suggest that support for the fundamental ideas animating the concept of political liberalism-and, thus, for the proposed agreement on what constitutes a reasonable demand-is often superficial and fragile and tends to fluctuate with circumstance, and therefore it cannot be considered to represent or provide the basis for a stable overlapping consensus.
One might challenge the validity of using past examples of unreasonable behaviour to question the existing degree of reasonableness or to argue against the likelihood of obtaining reasonable behaviour in the future; but what are the alternatives upon which to base such predictions? History, at least, provides concrete examples that, when sufficientinnumber and similarity, offer a reasonable and justifiable basis for suggesting the probability of certain actions or outcomes. If particular circumstances or stimuli have been observed to generate the same response (namely, unreasonable behaviour), time and time again, then surely it is not unreasonable to argue that, barring some significant and unpredictable change in citizens’ behaviour, it is likely that this pattern will, with few exceptions, continue. Conversely, in the absence of such a suggestive, discernible pattern, one can only guess as to the probable response to a given situation.
Hence, although it may not offer a guarantee, historical precedent is surely as solid a basis for prediction as is available. From this perspective, evidence of past (and present) unreasonable behaviour would seem to provide adequate justification for the belief that certain circumstances are likely to elicit the same type of behaviour.
Regrettably, contemporary examples of unreasonable behaviour seem discouragingly easy to find; indeed, much of recent history would seem to suggest that rather than humanity becoming more reasonable with the passage of time, the opposite is true. With alarming regularity the daily news is filled with accounts of unreasonable behaviour: racist, homophobic and other hatemotivated crimes and killings; military coups; the brutal oppression of secessionist movements; the violent and bloody disintegration of multi-ethnic states; and, perhaps most fiightening, instances of genocidal behaviour.

READ THE RELIGIOUS-CULTURAL DISCOURSE

CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL LffiERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL STABILITY
I. Introduction
II. Existing Analyses
III. The Thesis .
IV. The Importance of the Thesis
V. Development of Subject Matter
VI. Addendum-Terminology
CHAPTER TWO: THE LffiERAL OUTLOOK
I. Introduction .
II. The Problem of Defining Liberalism
III. The Roots of Liberalism
IV. The Primacy of the Individual .
V. The Purpose of Government
VI. Liberty .
VII. Private Property
VIII. Equality .
IX. Consen
X. Pluralism
XI. Toleration
XII. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL STABILITY, JUSTICE, AND LffiERALISM
I. Introduction
II. The Search for Political Stability
III. The Interdependence between Political Stability and Justice .
IV. Liberalism: The Final Variable in the Equation
V. Keeping Liberalism Effective .
VI. Prominent Proponents of Political Liberalism
VII. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL LffiERALISM
I. Introductio
II. The Character of a Political Conception
III. The Fact of Reasonable Disagreemen
IV. Reasonable Citizens
V. The Primacy of Reasonableness
VI. The Role of Rationality
VIII. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROBLEM OF REASONABLENESS
I. Introductio4
II. Reasonable People and the Absence of Conflict
III. Reasonableness and the Scope ofPolitical Values
IV. A Convincing Alternative Scenario?
V. The Reasonableness ofPublic Reaso
VI. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER SIX: POLITICAL POWER IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM .
BIBLIOGRAPHY