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Self-reliance v structural adjustment
In the wake of decolonisation, developing countries found themselves in the majority in global organisations such as the United Nations. This numerical advantage was used to promote the idea of the establishment of a new economic order that would result in more equal relations with the developed world. In 1974 the UN adopted the Declaration and Program of Action of the New International Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. However, the increased number of developing states did not correspond to a change in the international power balance and the international economic order did not change. In the late 1970’s the OAU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) set out to develop a continental development strategy. In 1980 the OAU Assembly adopted the resulting Lagos Plan of Action.15 The Plan only recognised external factors as an explanation for the lack of development.16
The proposed solution lay in self-reliance and regional cooperation. According to the Lagos Plan OAU member states should in their development plans give emphasis to ‘the development of agriculture and agrobased industries, development of socio-economic infrastructure, co-operation, eradication of mass poverty, unemployment, underemployment and the satisfaction of basic needs.’17 In the Final Act of Lagos, an annex to the Lagos Plan of Action, the Assembly set out to establish by the year 2000 an African Economic Community with regional economic communities in the five sub-regions of Africa as building blocks .
Criticism of NEPAD
Much of the ample criticism against NEPAD has centred on the notion that it ‘embraces the forces of neoliberal globalization, and promotes these forces as a cure for Africa’s ills.’113 The initiative is seen as just another application of the ‘Washington consensus’ and a continuation of structural adjustment.114 The underlying assumption that ‘integration into global markets solves poverty’ has
been much criticised as has other NEPAD prescriptions for achieving development, such as reliance on privatisation and information technology.115 NEPAD has also been criticised for ‘making aid a major factor’.116 Underlying this criticism is the view, expressed over seventy years ago, that ‘Africans must realize that he who pays the piper calls the tune … only through African philanthropy can this continent be saved from its impending doom’.117 There is also the risk that aid is diverted for elite consumption and to reinforce a neopatrimonial system rather than being used for investment.118 Some have contented that African states should not compete over conditional foreign direct investment.119 It has been argued that an Africa-owned programme should mainly be financed by the participants.120
The main criticism of NEPAD has been that it is a top down initiative adopted without any consultation.121 NEPAD is ‘a pledge by African leaders’.122 No civil society organisations were consulted in developing the initiative, even though civil society participation in development is recognised as essential in the NEPAD Declaration. This lack of consultation in drafting the plan must be seen as one of its major weaknesses.123 In an interview in July 2001, shortly after the adoption of NAI, Mbeki said that ‘these are not matters which can be confined to governments. The people have to be involved. What we will do here, is to ensure that there is that popular participation.’124 This is also reflected in the NEPAD Declaration that provides that the ‘agenda is based on national and regional priorities and development plans that must be prepared through participatory processes involving the people.’125 Nevertheless it has been argued that NEPAD does not provide for sufficient interaction with civil society.126 It must also be kept in mind that the 205 paragraph NEPAD Declaration is not all there is to NEPAD. Strategies have been adopted in a number of fields, such as health, environment and agricultural policy. Unfortunately, lack of consultation continues to be a problem in developing these initiatives.127
Financing the APRM
The high cost involved might also discourage some states from signing up to the process. The APRM is not funded through the AU budget. In the MOU the participating states agree to ‘contribute fully to the funding of the African Peer Review Mechanism in order to affirm the African ownership of the Mechanism. This includes sourcing funds from African people, businesses and institutions.’45 The Forum has decided that a country that has signed the APRM MOU should contribute at least US$ 100 000 annually to the APRM Secretariat.46 Only a few countries have fulfilled this requirement. From 2004 to the end of October 2008 the APRM raised nearly US$ 17.5 million from member states. South Africa was the single largest contributor to the APRM budget with a contribution of US$ 6 million.47 An APRM Trust Fund has been established and managed by the UNDP. Non African contributions to the Trust Fund from 2004 to the end of October 2008 were more than US$ 13 million.48
Estimated expenditure for regional APRM activities in 2008 was US$ 5.3 million. Of this a bit over US$ 3 million was expenditure for the Secretariat. The cost of review visits and support missions was estimated at US$ 1.4 million.49 This does not include the participation of staff from the African Development Bank, UNECA and UNDP as these organisations fund their own participation in country review visits and support missions.50 It should also be noted that the Development Bank of Southern Africa has provided ‘treasury services, including a bridging facility of ZAR 10 million, along with financial and accounting, disbursement, procurement and contracting, legal, logistical, and human resource management services.’51 South Africa is to continue to bear some costs for the Secretariat under the host agreement concluded in October 2008.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and problem statement
1.2 Objective of the study and research questions
1.3 Terminology
1.4 Literature review
1.5 Methodology
1.6 Structure of the study
1.7 Limitations
Chapter 2: The quest for development
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The failure of development
2.3 The African renaissance and NEPAD
2.4 Concluding remarks
Chapter 3: The APRM mandate and human rights
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Developing the APRM
3.3 Purpose and mandate
3.4 Indicators and benchmarking
3.5 The human rights mandate of the APRM
3.6 Concluding remarks
Chapter 4: Structure and process: Participation, accountability and transparency
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The review process
4.3 Institutional structure at the international level
4.4 The national structures and process: Ensuring participation and credibility
4.5 Accountability
4.6 Transparency
4.7 Concluding remarks
Chapter 5: Inducing compliance with human rights
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The international human rights regime
5.3 Commitment
5.4 Compliance theory
5.5 International monitoring methods
5.6 Factors affecting compliance
5.7 Concluding remarks
Chapter 6: Ghana
6 Introduction
6.2 Linkages with other national plans
6.3 Financing
6.4 Adherence to international human rights standards and cooperation with international monitoring bodies
6.5 Compliance with substantive human rights norms
6.6 Protection of vulnerable groups
6.7 Compliance with peoples’ rights
6.8 Human rights education
6.9 Domestic institutions for the protection of human rights
6.10 Concluding remarks
Chapter 7: Rwanda
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Linkages with other national plans
7.3 Financing
7.4 Adherence to international human rights standards and cooperation with international monitoring bodies
7.5 Compliance with substantive human rights norms
7.6 Protection of vulnerable groups
7.7 Compliance with peoples’ rights
7.8 Human rights education
7.9 Domestic institutions for the protection of human rights
7.10 Concluding remarks
Chapter 8: Kenya
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Linkages with other national plans
8.3 Financing
8.4 Adherence to international human rights standards and cooperation with international monitoring bodies
8.5 Compliance with substantive human rights norms
8.6 Protection of vulnerable groups
8.7 Compliance with peoples’ rights
8.8 Human rights education
8.9 Domestic institutions for the protection of human rights
8.10 Concluding remarks
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 Summary of findings
9.2 Conclusion and recommendations
