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The emergency mechanism surrounding the drafting of the constitution
In 1959, after he was vested with full powers that allowed him to design a constitution without the Assembly, Prime Minister Ahidjo set up a Constitutional Committee [Comité Constitutionnel]. As the Assembly went on recess, the Committee that was then formed out of parliament, had civil servants, political and religious leaders, and traditional kings as members.198 In the meantime, protected by the French army and locked up in his palace, Ahidjo’s priority was to reinforce his personal powers.199The constitutional scenario was to instrumentalise members of the Constitutional Committee by appointing them to the current government, a practice that aimed at dissuading them from any contestation.200 As this Committee had no real power, key opposition figures like Daniel Kemajou and Soppo Priso simply refused to be associated with it.201 The Committee had no power because the real architects of the first Constitution of Cameroun were not part of this Committee.202 In fact the constitution was drafted in a single night by two French advisers, Jacques Rousseau and Paul Audat.203 It was later proofread by a French political science expert, Maurice Duverger, who agreed to be part of the legal mockery for a fee.204 Since the initial provisions were too liberal, it is reported that Colonel Jacques Richard, the French Commander of the gendarmerie in Cameroun, persuaded Duverger to include certain repressive sections (such as Section 20 on a state of emergency and a state of exception) in the constitutional draft to counter the ongoing rebellion.205 Gaillard sarcastically commented that in the absence of a secretary, ‘an eminent professor fashioned the draft Constitution for Cameroun under the dictates of a policeman.
The place of parliament in emergency regimes: Dicey’s concept of legality
This approach posits that in case of exceptional circumstances, it is an absolute right and even a duty not only for the government, but also for any soldier or civilian whether connected to the administration or not, to react for the restoration of order. Contrary to the common conception that assimilates emergency regimes to the special powers of the executive body, this approach recalls that martial rule does not confer upon the state or its citizens, special powers for the circumstance. Accordingly, officers, magistrates, soldiers, policemen, and ordinary citizens are all equal before the law and they are each and all of them, liable and accountable for the use of unnecessary force. However, Dicey is aware of some constraints that may necessitate the use of discretionary powers that are denied to the Crown by the law of the land. The approach suggests that the executive body formally requests these powers in advance from the legislature. The legislature should be the body granting such discretionary powers as it is the supreme authority in charge of making laws. Therefore, if these laws were to be broken, it is reasonable that parliament be the body entitled to break them. Dicey’s concept of legality also gives rise to a situation where the executive body might be compelled to react prior to parliamentary permission. In this case, authorities can break the law and request for an act of indemnity, which is a parliamentary control implemented subsequently. In this section, I examine Dicey’s concept of legality through the characteristics of English martial law on the one hand and parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law on the other.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1. Thesis statement
2. Assumptions
3. Research questions
4. Motivations
5. Proposed structure
CHAPTER 2 THE FEATURES OF EMERGENCY REGIMES IN CAMEROUN
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Emergency regimes in Cameroun before independence: a legacy of colonialism
2.3 The move toward ‘independence’ and the formalisation of emergency regimes in Cameroun
2.4 Emergency regimes in Cameroun after ‘independence’: a major legal instrument of government
2.5 Concluding remarks
CHAPTER 3 EMERGENCY REGIMES IN CAMEROON AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Assessing the international standards on emergency regimes through the lens of Cameroon experience
3.3 Concluding remarks
CHAPTER 4 LEGAL AND THEORETICAL DISCOURSES ON EMERGENCY REGIMES
4.1 Introduction
4.2 On the maxim necessitas non habet legem
4.3 The Normative approach to emergency regimes
4.4 The critical approach to emergency regimes
4.5 Walter Benjamin and the messianism
4.6 Giorgio Agamben and the political nihilism
CHAPTER 5 THE MODERN EXPRESSION OF EMERGENCY REGIMES IN CAMEROON: THE IMPLICIT EXCEPTION
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The mechanism of the implicit within the Cameroon context: reducing the law to the zero point of its own content
5.3 The hallmarks of the implicit exception in Cameroon
5.4 Concluding remarks
CHAPTER 6 CONSEQUENCES OF THE NORMALISATION OF EMERGENCY REGIMES: THE DECLINE OF CAMEROON STATE
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The case of an implicit and hypocritical enforcement of a state of siege under the guise of Commandement Opérationnel
6.3 Violence as a mode of political expression and resistance to authority
6.4 The logic of exit from the state: secessionist claims and emigration in Cameroon
6.5 Concluding remarks
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
7.1. Introduction
7.2. Summary of findings
7.3. Suggestions
BIBLIOGRAPHY
