Towards a new neuroscience of artistic appreciation

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CHAPTER 3: ARTISTIC TASK-SETS, MENTAL IMAGES, AND EMOTIONS: KEYS FOR THE NEUROSCIENCE OF ARTISTIC APPRECIATION

 Introduction

Let us recapitulate the argument developed in this thesis so far. Neuroaesthetics can be considered as a philosophical-scientific programme that seeks to answer two key questions of aesthetics, namely what is art and how do we appreciate it?
In the first part of this thesis, the focus was mostly on the philosophical part of the neuroaesthetics research programme, and in particular, on the extent to which neuroaesthetics appropriately responds to the question of what art is. This entailed a twofold answer. First, neuroaesthetics defines art in terms of necessary and sufficient properties that make an object an artwork. Second, the implication is that the necessary and sufficient properties that make an object an artwork include the specific function that the object can perform, a function that all artworks and only artworks can perform. For neuroaesthetics, this function is identified with a cognitive/emotional state or process that only artworks can provoke (see Table 1.1, p. 10).
It is important to remember this definition of art because it underlies the experimental programme of neuroaesthetics concerning artistic/aesthetic appreciation and its three core postulates:
1) Artwork = specific function.
2) Specific function = emotional/cognitive state evoked in the subject.
3) Research must elucidate how artworks perform their specific function. In other words, how do artworks evoke in subjects the emotional/cognitive state that is identified with the specific function of art?
In the third part, as in the second part of the work, I do not just attempt to describe and evaluate the experimental part of neuroaesthetics, I also try to demonstrate that the neuroaesthetic programme in its current form is untenable in light of empirical evidence. Finally, I offer my own theoretical postulate about possible cerebral mechanisms and the systems involved in artistic/aesthetic appreciation.

 The experimental programme of neuroaesthetics

How do artworks evoke the identified emotional/cognitive condition through the specific function of art? In short, for neuroaesthetics, the identified emotional/cognitive condition stimulated by art is a function of the objective properties of artworks. So, if we denote the objective properties (see Section 1.3.2; 2.2) of artworks by P and the identified emotional/cognitive status stimulated by the specific function of art by A (for artistic appreciation), we have the function f (P) = A, where f denotes mechanisms in specific cerebral cortex areas. And where the subscript n indicated the number of possible properties (see Section 2.2).
In regard to neuroaesthetics (see Section 1.3), the mechanisms associated with artistic appreciation are essentially bottom-up mechanisms that depend exclusively on the mode in which the specific cerebral cortex areas (e.g., visual cortex, auditory cortex) respond to the objective properties of artworks (Ramachandran, 2004; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999; Redies, 2007; Skov & Vartanian, 2009; Zeki, 1999).
Artistic appreciation is a function of the objective properties of artworks and the systems and mechanisms of specific cortex modalities involved in the processing of these objective properties, which provide very important implications for the study of artistic appreciation. Two points, in particular, are of interest:
a) Since A (artistic appreciation) is a function of P (objective properties), each time P is given, the result is A. So, if x has the appropriate objective properties P1, P2 … Pn, then the subject S will experience an artistic appreciation. This implies, among other things, that artistic appreciation is independent of the knowledge and expectations of subjects. In other words, artistic appreciation does not depend on ‘top-down’ (or ‘knowledge-based’) processes. It should be mentioned that some properties may be acquired by learning (exposure to art) in which case they are knowledge-based.
b) Thus, to explain it in the neuroscientific context, the processes of artistic appreciation are reduced to describe the systems and mechanisms of specific cerebral cortex areas involved in the processing of the objective properties of artworks.
As Bullot and Reber point out, the experimental programme proposed by neuroaesthetics (Ramachandran, 2011; Skov & Vartanian, 2009; Zeki, 1999) is nothing more than a continuation (or radicalisation) of the analysis of the experimental model of psychophysical aesthetics (Bullot & Reber, 2013; see also Silva, 2012). Indeed, the guiding principle of psychophysical aesthetics is that aesthetic (artistic) responses associated with artworks are a function of one or several properties of the objects of art. Thus, an experiment on psychophysical aesthetics typically involves measuring some objective responses (e.g., response times, eye movements) and/or some psychometric scale (in particular, scales of beauty or pleasure), as well as observing how these responses vary according to alterations caused by the stimulus (artwork) (Palmer, Gardner & Wickens, 2008, 2013; Quiroga & Pedreira, 2011; Samuel & Kerzel, 2013; Silva, 2012). The only difference between the experimental model of psychophysics and neuroaesthetics is that while psychophysics treats the mental mechanisms of aesthetic (artistic) responses as a black box, neuroaesthetics seeks to precisely understand these mental processes in terms of mechanisms and systems (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
Evidence against neuroaesthetics
The experimental programme of neuroaesthetics may be unsustainable for both conceptual and empirical reasons. First of all, I briefly comment on the conceptual reasons that this programme may be considered untenable.

Conceptual evidence

The experimental programme of neuroaesthetics is based on two presuppositions. First, the definition of an object as an artwork stems from its ability to provoke a cognitive/emotional condition or process that only artworks can provoke. In other words, if x is an artwork, then the features (Pn) associated with x provoke (or is capable of provoking) the cognitive/emotional condition in a subject s. Second, the factor that causes the object x to lead to the cognitive/emotional state e in the subject s is a set of objective properties of the object x (see Section 3.1).
However, as we saw in the first (Section 1.2) and second (Section 2.5) parts of the functionalism (or neofunctionalism) on which neuroaesthetics is founded, is highly problematic. As Danto (1973) points out, one of the most striking features of modern art is that many artworks are indistinguishable from other everyday objects (non-artworks). Thus, two (or more) objects with the same objective properties can be categorised and treated differently—one as an artwork and the other as not art (Danto,1973, Figures 1.11, 1.12, and 1.13). It is also easy to find objects that can provoke those conditions that have been identified with the function of art and yet are not regarded as objects of art.
This presents an interesting problem, because if we do not know what an artwork is, we can hardly be assured that we can study the cerebral mechanisms and systems involved in the appreciation of artworks. In this thesis, I propose a new definition of artwork that I think is useful for the development of the neuroscientific study of the appreciation of art. Let us remember: x is a φ-artwork sys a) x is an artefact and b) x is constructed (intentionally or otherwise) according to the set of conventions (F, T, M, H, O) established by the artistic world (A, E) (see Section 2.4, 2.7.4; Table 2.3).
According to this definition of artwork (φ-artwork), regardless of what neuroaesthetics suggests, implies among other things that the recognition of an object as an artwork, far from being an almost reflexive action dependent on the objective properties of the object, includes a learning process. We must learn what features define an object as an artwork and distinguish it from things that are not artworks. In particular, one must learn a system of conventions sanctioned by an artistic world to determine what things constitute artworks. In other words, one must learn that the object x is an artwork if and only if it satisfies the key functions associated with systems or objects of art. Thus, it must be constructed with materials m, formal resources f, and themes t, to be exhibited (or executed) in a context or habitat h, in a society and a time t, to realise an artistic objective o. Moreover, the system of conventions not only changes with time and societies; even in the same society and time, different systems of conventions coexist, which are associated with different artistic systems and complexes. This means that a subject has to learn different systems of conventions to correctly categorise different objects and different types of artworks (φ-artwork).

Part I: TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF AESTHETICS
CHAPTER 1 NEUROAESTHETICS
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Consolidation of the theoretical research focus and outline of the chapters
1.3 What is neuroaesthetics?
1.4 Three cases: the neuroaesthetics of Zeki, Ramachandran and Miall
1.5 Miall´s literary neuroaesthetics
1.6 Towards a new neuroscience of artistic appreciation
1.7 Preview of subsequent chapters
CHAPTER 2 A NEW CONCEPTUAL FAMEWORK FOR AESTHETICS
2.1 Introduction: The long way to a definition of art
2.2 What do we mean when we talk about art?
2.3 Definition of art
2.4 Defining artistic systems
2.5 Components of an artistic system
2.6 Distinguishing between art and artist
2.7 Art as a system of conventions
2.8 Some implications: The scope of aesthetics
2.9 Summary of part 1
Part II: AESTHETICS AND NEUROSCIENCE
CHAPTER 3 ARTISTIC TASK-SETS, MENTAL IMAGES, AND EMOTIONS: KEYS FOR THE NEUROSCIENCE OF ARTISTIC APPRECIATION
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The experimental programme of neuroaesthetics
3.3 Psychological models of artistic appreciation
3.4 A brain system for artistic appreciation: the ‘artistic task-set’
3.5 Mental images and emotions. Towards an understanding of a literary Phenomenon
3.6 Summary of part 2
3.7 Conclusions
Part III: THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE NEUROSCIENTIFIC STUDY OF ARTISTIC APPRECIATION
CHAPTER 4 THE MIND IS THE BRAIN
4.1 Introduction
4.2 A mind for neuroaesthetics
4.3 A hierarchical and emergent model of mental functions
4.4 Concluding remarks
4.5 Summary of chapter 4
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Summary and contributions of the study
5.2 Towards a new theoretical framework
5.3 Some limitations of the research
5.4 Future research prospects
5.5 Conclusion
REFERENCES
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